Delta Company History (1965-66) First NVA Regimental CP entry by Recon 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav near Cambodia border (SW of Pleiku) on January 8, 1966 by RANGER SGT Jerome Conners (Chinese Bandit 13)

On January 5, 1966 the 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav air assaulted into LZs near the Cambodia border of Vietnam. The planned assault into Cambodia to pursue the fleeing NVA that were encountered during the battle of the Ia Drang had been cancelled. The operation was restricted to a hilly and heavily forested area immediately adjacent to Cambodia where the route of the NVA withdrawal had been detected by reconnaissance aircraft. The rifle companies and the Chinese Bandit Recon Platoon conducted patrols around the LZs where caches of rice and an abandoned NVA field hospital were located by the Recon Platoon on January 6.

The hospital consisted of two main open bamboo framed buildings having thatched roofs. Two rows of single raised bamboo beds were constructed in each of the buildings that were approximately 30 foot long by 15 foot wide. Several other smaller huts were located near the larger buildings. The compound was located at the intersection of three trails and covered by dense tall trees that concealed the site from the air. One of the trails lead towards the border and was one of two trails that showed recent heavy foot traffic. A large knife was shoved into the roof thatching of one of the hospitals with only the handle exposed. A close examination of the knife revealed batteries that were taped together and a trigger device connected to several American 2.75 inch FF aerial rockets. Helicopters overflew the site while we conducted our inspection and we were instructed to burn the buildings and return to the battalion LZ Stallion. We did not remain in the area after setting the fires but hastily departed the area and did not hear any detonations during our return.

Early the following morning, the Chinese Bandits were notified to prepare for patrols to the south west in the area along the Se San river which formed the boundary with Ratanakiri Province of Cambodia. SSG Robert Grimes was serving as the acting Platoon Leader and Platoon Sergeant and spent the morning studying the maps and aerial photos with his three scout squad leaders. A route was selected which followed a trail that had been discovered the previous day by one of the rifle companies and was believed to lead towards the river. The trail was not depicted on the detailed topographic maps that we were provided. Warning orders and operations orders were given to the squads in the afternoon and equipment was readied for an expected contact with a large NVA force that was believed to be on one side of the river or the other. The patrols were expected to extend beyond the available 81mm mortars located at the battalion LZs and pre-arranged fires were planned for using ARA and tactical air support only.

Our patrolling skills had continually improved since our arrival in country and we were capable of accomplishing the tasks assigned; however, the excitement of the anticipated action kept most of us awake and talking late into the night.

In the morning, we donned our equipment and ranger patrol caps and began the slow advance to the border. Second Scout Squad, Chinese Bandit 12, was lead by SSG “Ranger” Terry Lawson and was the first in the order of march. His squad followed the trail for about half a mile before deciding to move along the treed area parallel to the trail and continued along the trail until the terrain dropped off towards the river. We stopped at the point that Lawson first saw the river which was one to two hundred feet across and as depicted on the aerial photos. Grimes and the other scout squad leaders linked up with Lawson and were informed that there were NVA boot prints on the trail a few hundred meters ahead where his point team had discovered them. While we were discussing our options a flock of birds landed in the tall trees overhead, we could not see them but heard them and they flew off towards the river a few moments later. We were concerned that the birds have given our position away. Lawson suggested that he rejoin his two-man point team and that we slowly advance towards the river. Grimes agreed and also directed that his 1st Scout Squad move forward from the rear and take the place of the 3d Scout Squad in the order of march.

We moved slowly down the hill with each squad paralleling both sides of the trail until the trail became closer to a stream on our left where the vegetation was dense and the tree height much less. Lawson and his point team detected disturbed and what appeared to be cleared vegetation on the hillside on the other side of the steam and had stopped. We were about a half a mile from the river. Lawson withdrew to where Grimes was located and the other scout squad leaders had assembled. “Can you smell it?” he asked. Before we could respond he stated “Cooking fires, people, not sure.” We had not noticed. He said, “When you get further down by the creek, you will notice it.”

Lawson described shallow dug holes and a network of trails located on the other side of the stream that he had seen using his binoculars. Grime’s RTO sent the report on the battalion command net and notified LTC Mertel, the Battalion Commander, that we had stopped and attempting to observe at a distance. Mertel instructed Grimes to pull back if NVA troops were spotted and that ARA units were being alerted and to remain on standby. All three scout squads moved slowly further away from the trail and the lead scout squad attempted to place themselves in positions to observe the trail and other hillside. Lawson was able to advance to where the trail formed an intersection and three pieces of six-inch diameter bamboo formed a footbridge over the stream. He withdrew after examining the area for about half an hour and returned slowly to where Grimes and the other scout squad leaders were waiting. “It’s a bivouac site of some type. Will hold at least two hundred troops. But I don’t think it is occupied.” Grimes again reported the situation to LTC Mertel who immediately instructed the Chinese Bandits to withdraw and join him at LZ Stallion.

We arrived at the LZ late in the afternoon. Grimes and the battalion commander discussed the options and a decision was made that the Chinese Bandits would return to the site that was now believed to be a NVA regimental CP at night and establish ambush sites along the trails leading into the bivouac site. Everyone ate and planned quickly and we were ready to depart again in an hour. The Chinese Bandits advanced along the same route that was used earlier and reached the area overlooking the suspected NVA bivouac site by 2030 hours. Lawson’s 2d Scout Squad took up positions near the bamboo foot bridge, 1st and 3d Scout Squads remained along the trail where we had been earlier in the day. During the preparation for the patrol a few hours earlier, a tentative plan was made that Lawson and one of the other Scout Squad Leaders would enter the bivouac area after darkness to determine if the site was occupied by NVA troops. As darkness fell and the ambush sites were established and readied, the plan to scout the bivouac site was discussed with Grimes and the scout squad leaders. The decision was made to enter the site and determine its boundaries and if it was occupied.

Lawson and SGT Jerry Conners, 3d Scout Squad Leader moved slowly upstream where the vegetation was less thick and were able to cross the stream and drainage without much difficulty. They proceeded downstream along the base of the hill and quickly came to the perimeter of the bivouac site. Both men moved slowly and low crawled uphill remaining about 20 feet apart. It was dark under the trees but the river opening provided a backdrop where any movement a few feet above the ground could be observed. No enemy troops were heard or seen. When reaching the southern limit of the bivouac area they discussed the size and spacing of the shallow trenches and erected corner poles that were located near most excavations and determine the site to occupy about 400 feet along the river and about two hundred feet from the river. The number of holes indicated that about 500 men and therefore, a NVA regimental CP used the bivouac site. Other members of the regiment would occupy sites that approached this central location. Both men decided to stand and walk back through the bivouac site towards the Chinese Bandits that were occupying the ambush sites.

After linking up with Grimes, he decided to lead the 1st Scout Squad through the bivouac site and locate another ambush site along the trail on the opposite south side of the unoccupied regimental CP.

The Chinese Bandits remained in position without enemy contact until the following morning when three NVA troops walked into Grime’s ambush site and were captured about one hour before sunrise.

Grimes and the scout squad leaders met one more time at sunrise near the northern edge of the regimental CP where Grimes gave a radio report to LTC Mertel. Mertel directed that Grimes and the 1st Scout Squad would return to LZ Stallion and the 2d and 3d Scout Squads would continue patrolling separately south and north of the NVA regimental CP.

Later in the morning water buffalo were observed tethered to stakes driven in the river on the Cambodia side of the Se San. The trails were well used but no additional enemy contact was made and the two remaining scout squads returned to LZ Stallion using separate routes.

Regarding this operation Colonel Kenneth D. Mertel would later write in his book Year of the Horse:Vietnam 1st Air Cavalry in the Highlands 1965-66 “they (Chinese Bandits) had tremendous pride and spirit…found the largest enemy target, the regimental bivouac…” and captured the attention of senior Department of Defense, MACV, and 5th Special Forces commanders and staff responsible for long range reconnaissance operations. S.L.A. Marshall, General (Retired) stated that he initially selected the Chinese Bandits for inclusion in his book Battles in the Monsoon as a result of this operation and the later DOD/MACV directed long range reconnaissance patrols along the Cambodia and Laos borders that were conducted by the Bandits in the spring of 1966. General Marshall’s book includes an entire chapter entitled “The Long Patrol” which depicts the Chinese Bandits performing their routine battalion reconnaissance and combat roles.


Delta Company History (1965-66) Raindrops and tracking the NVA during Operation Crazy Horse, May 22-23, 1966 by Ranger Jerry Conners, Chinese Bandit 13 and War Eagle 13

The patrol moved north to the location where we encountered abandoned NVA bunkers that contained the body of one NVA soldier that was discovered in one of the deeper excavations. While evaluating the bunker complex, an American rifle squad consisting of 8 men approached from the north “team carrying” one of their men (believed to be a SP/4 Parks) in a poncho litter. The man was semi-conscious and the poncho was filled to his armpits in a mixture of his blood and rain. I called for medivac and had some of the patrol members bring in the UH-1. The man was evacuated to the sound of rifle and machine gun fire from the surrounding hills when the aircraft was on approach and during departure. The UH-1 was not damaged and I was informed many years later that Parks had survived.

We resumed our search of the bunkers and located another trail having fresh barefoot and non-American boot marks leading to the west up the hill in the direction that we had been directed to recon.

We had been in contact with NVA forces for two days. The eight-man patrol, including myself, had little or no sleep for three days and we had experienced near continuous movement in the steep and heavily treed mountainous terrain in the area we call ‘Happy Valley’. We had been mistakenly attacked by two UH-1 gunships earlier in the afternoon and although no one was injured, our sole PRC radio was damaged and unable to transmit when the RTO sought cover from the four 2.75 FFAR that were launched in our direction. I had made the decision to proceed in our mission to complete the planned patrol route without reliable radio communications.

The patrol was moving downhill along the trail approaching the stream located in the valley below which marked the limit of the authorized area of operation. Anticipating contact with the NVA at any moment, we were not spread out long distances as was the norm when searching for the NVA but remained in line of sight of each other. The point man, Combat Jones, stopped near the stream and signaled enemy contact ahead. I advanced to join him after signaling the others of the situation.

As I approached Jones, he pointed toward the stream near the trail crossing where the trail led up the hill on the far side of the stream. The bloated bodies of two NVA troops were lying in the water still clad in their uniforms and web gear. I waded into the water and examined the bodies. They had no weapons and their wounds appeared to have been from irregular shaped fragments, not bullets. The surrounding area showed evidence of 2.75 FFAR impacts.

Jones and I scouted both sides of the stream and did not locate trails running parallel to the waterway. I returned to my position in the patrol and signaled Jones to proceed. He entered the water and we followed him for less than two hours to where a game trail intersection was anticipated. Jones stopped when he saw the large abandoned but overgrown slash and burn clearing on his right. We halted in the stream and I advanced ahead of Jones searching for the trail that was quickly located less than 100 meters in front of where we had halted. The trail had recently been actively used by the NVA. As I returned to Jones, he pointed vigorously over my left shoulder in the direction of the upper edge of the slash and burn clearing. I turned to see more than 30 NVA troops filing down the edge of the clearing towards the stream. I was concerned that any movement in the stream would dislodge silt, sands or debris that might mark the water further downstream; however, I carefully moved back along the patrol positioned and briefed each man to not move and what was occurring out front. Returning to Jones who had been left to observe, he informed me that he had counted more than 200 NVA who continued to file out of the tree line at the top of the clearing. We remained in position for another thirty minutes until the last NVA was observed. Jones’ total count had reached 423 men that wore khaki uniforms and were carrying only individual weapons. No crew-served weapons were observed. At about the time we lost sight of the last NVA trailing the others, we heard NVA crossing the stream ahead of us. Their crossing made no detectable noise but their distinctive sing song language could be heard for more than 100 meters.

While the NVA filed unseen but heard ahead of us, artillery fire began to impact several thousand meters further down the valley and was advancing in our direction. It was later learned that this was an impromptu H&I fire mission. The artillery fire continued for about five minutes and the closest rounds fell only about 1000 meters from our position. The NVA could be heard to be advancing uphill in the direction of friendly forces. They shouted often during the artillery barrage.

I looked at my stainless steel Omega SeaMaster watch when the last of the NVA crossing the steam was heard. We remained in position for another 10 minutes and then began our movement downstream towards the trail. I kept looking back at the patrol but could only see Jones wearing his in-country made scroll patch and red scarf grinning back at me. I remained in the point position as was common for NCOs to do when closing with the enemy. Nightfall was approaching and I intended to move around the NVA if they stopped during the night. I came to the trail and quickly searched for NVA stragglers along the route they had used on the lower edge of the slash and burn clearing while Jones held the patrol in the water.

Not locating any remaining NVA near the stream, I rejoined the patrol and briefed Cpl Matsuoka, my team leader, of my concerns of further NVA approaching from our rear as we followed the sighted NVA up the hill.

We had about thirty minutes of adequate light remaining under overcast skies before EENT and as we began to follow the 400+ NVA uphill. A light rain began to fall as the sound of an approach H-13 observation helicopter was heard overhead. On point, I stopped the patrol and located the helicopter flying along the stream at about 2000 feet AGL. I waited until the noise of the helicopter was no longer a factor and continued up the hill as the rain continued to fall. I had only advanced about 75 meters up the hill from the stream where a small tree opening in the trail allowed the rainfall to impact the trail. I watched the droplets land in one set of NVA tracks. I studied the track that consisted of a flat smoothly worn ‘tennis shoe’ like print. There were many droplet impacts in the track and I examined several more as I moved slowly leaning over the trail. A fresh imprint with no water droplet markings lay before me. I watched as raindrops fell into the fresh track. I had not intended to become that close. I turned and gave the ‘freeze’ signal that was passed along the patrol filing behind me. I gave a second signal using two fingers racked across my upper arm that was also passed down the line. I waited facing the enemy’s position until Cpl Matsuoka joined me. I pointed to the prints near me and the raindrop markings that indicated the closeness of the NVA. I instructed him to observe from beside a tree along the trail located about 10 meters from where we were kneeling and to remain in place as I held the men in position while I considered the merits of withdrawing or at least getting some distance between the NVA and ourselves.

A few minutes later the sound of the returning H-13 was heard and I again waited until the helicopter was clear of the area. As the sounds of the H-13 disappeared two M-16 shots rang out in quick succession. Again, I signaled to hold and began moving uphill towards Matsuoka who I met coming down the trail. He explained that one NVA had come within 10 feet of him before he fired. As he spoke we could hear the singsong speech of NVA coming down the hill towards us. I ran towards the patrol and with Matsuoka’s assistance quickly put the men on line with myself adjacent to the trail on the left and Jones on the other side of the trail.

Going on line was an ignorant decision and I knew it immediately. I yelled to Matsuoka to take the men down the trail and follow the stream back along our route and then take the first major stream drainage uphill that led in the direction of the friendly forces and keep moving until darkness, then wait for me. I ordered Jones to remain with me. As the men ran past us and down the trail I knew that Jones and I would die in the next few minutes. I pulled the pin from my only fragmentation grenade and waited for the NVA to overrun us. The NVA kept yelling amongst one another and fanned out along either side of the trail for a distance of about 50 meters but they did not advance. Jones and I remained in position as more of the NVA filed down the hill to join their comrades that were less than 30 meters in front of where we were laying. I looked at my watch and the grenade I held in my left hand. It was getting dark and the patrol had been gone about 10 minutes. I turned towards Jones and said “Run and join the patrol.” He responded, “No, I am staying with you.” I reached across the trail and pulled him towards me. “Get out of here and I will be right behind you. Now.” Jones spun around on his stomach and alligator crawled down the trail as fast as he could move. I followed him with the grenade still in my hand and the pin left behind. I dropped my ranger patrol cap with its ‘merit’ badges along the trail but could not pick it up without stopping. The cap was left behind. The trail was steeper as we neared the stream and Jones jumped to his feet and ran and then jumped into the stream. I followed him and we both ran up the stream from the direction we had come earlier.

It was now dark enough to make our being followed difficult and we did not hear the NVA in pursuit. After about five minutes we came to the junction of the stream drainage that I had intended Matsuoka to follow uphill. I was concerned that he may have taken another route but continued to run up the shallow stream for about five minutes where we found the other members of the patrol forming a line perpendicular to the stream flow. I spoke as loud as appropriate, “Follow me!” and continued up the stream for another half an hour. We were exhausted from days without sleep, walking the long patrol distance, running from the NVA and the anxiety of the recent contact with the enemy. We had approached a steep section of the stream where numerous small waterfalls had formed. The rain was still falling lightly.

Still holding the grenade, I directed the men to form a line in the deep-water pockets amongst the rocks. As the men filed by I told them we would rest and “Sleep if you want to.” Once we were secure in what seemed to be a safe hiding place, I intended to dedicate my best thoughts to getting the patrol out of harms way and quickly decided to rest a few hours and then move up hill during darkness to link up with the friendly forces at first light. I wanted to sleep but could not with the grenade in my hand. I loosened some C-ration wire from my LBE harness and fashioned a pin that I twisted into the pin holes of the grenade. I snapped my LBE to Jones’s who was bobbing in the water next to me and fell asleep. I awoke some time later to the sounds of the NVA searching for us. Their voices and the beams of their flashlights came near enough to be heard and seen but they did not approach the stream in which we were hiding but continued downhill. I fell back asleep thinking that we could only rest a few more minutes before resuming our movement up the hill. The sky was lighting when I awoke again.

I briefed the men who formed a circle around me near the stream where we had been resting and warned them of the dangers of approaching an American combat unit that was not expecting our arrival.

Jones led us up the mountain. When we neared the ridgeline and where I expected our troops to be located. I yelled, “American troops approaching, hold your fire.” Before I could make another request SSG Grimes yelled back, “This is Chinese Bandit 11, stay put and I will be down to lead you through.” In a few minutes, I saw him approaching. He said, “They believe you were missing in action and had ‘bought the farm. I told them ‘no way’.” I shoved him and said, “Never.” The rain had stopped. As we walked up the hill and down into the valley to join the rest of the unit I watched the sun come up over the other hill and I told Grimes, “I thought I would never see the sun again.” He just stared at me.

I watched as the men filed by in their jungle fatigues and patrol caps. They were full of ‘piss and vinegar’ and the tired faces that I had seen the night before were gone. They were celebrating being alive.

Note: This article was originally posted on the Jumping Mustang home page by Col Mertel, USA Retired in 2000.


Delta Company History (1965-66)
BONG SON 1966 by SGT Jerome Conners (Chinese Bandit 13)
At Bong Son we were digging in and registering fire. It was night and when one of the rounds exploded about 200 meters from our position, we could hear the sounds of children crying and screaming. One of the battalion medics, SP5 ? ran from our perimeter into the darkness yelling "cease fire". Several of us followed him and discovered a building with about thirty women and children huddled together. They had not been injured but were terrified by the close detonations. When we were running towards the sounds, our mortar rounds were still "on the way". Those of us that were following "Doc" tried to get him to slow down. He didn't and we covered the 100 yards or so in seconds.

If it had not been for "Doc's" immediate action, those non-combatants could and most probably would have been seriously hurt. He took this action knowing that he was running into or near our own falling mortar fire.

Our men repeatedly put themselves at risk for each other and friendly civilians. We were there to help those people and committed to destroying the NVA/VC and doing what we could to keep the civilians safe and out of harms way.


Delta Company History (1965-66) SPRING 1966 LONG RANGE RECONNAISSANCE PATROL (LRRP) by RANGER SGT Jerome Conners (Chinese Bandit 13)

A Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) was formed from members of the 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav Recon platoon and attached to division headquarters in the spring of 1966 as directed by the Department of Defense where seven LRRP teams from the US Army Special Forces, US Marine Corps, Navy and other Army units were established to conduct simultaneous patrols within the Republic of Vietnam. LRRP operations had been suspended in Vietnam following the detection of the B-52 recon teams and the 1st Cav Division’s insertion of an infantry battalion adjacent to a previously undetected NVA regiment. This operation was intended to assess the capability of selected American intelligence units to conduct LRRP operations for the purpose of locating and observing large size NVA units and identify any changes warranted prior to the resumption of long range ground reconnaissance operations in SE Asia.

The Chinese Bandit six man team members were SSG Robert Grimes (Acting Platoon Leader of the Recon Platoon), SGT Jerry Conners, Keijo Hyvonen, Frank Bishop, Louis Tyler, and Terry Stevens. The first long range patrol was conducted along a 75 mile route adjacent to the Cambodian and Laotian borders for a period of twelve days and was performed while the other DOD directed teams performed LRRP operations in other portions of Vietnam. The major objective of the patrol was to locate North Vietnamese positions that had been reported along the border and to obtain specific essential elements of information that included descriptions of the enemy’s uniforms, weapons, communication and other equipment and the presence of any Caucasian personnel.

We wore a mixture of uniforms including standard issue jungle fatigues, WWII vintage M42 jungle camouflage fatigues and 'tiger fatigues'. All members wore patrol caps, LBE with two canteens, two ammo pouches containing four magazines each, one butt pack and carried M-16 rifles (taped with slings removed) with bayonets. Two members of the patrol also wore NVA captured rucksacks. Only one 35mm camera and two sets of binoculars and one small IR device were carried. The first LRRP rations were issued and each member carried six after removing the outer package and discarding everything except the main dehydrated meal. We intended to only eat one meal every other day and our diet was supplemented by a variety of foods including ‘jungle chocolate candy bars’. Only one PRC-25 radio was carried; however, a vertical half-rhombic antenna was assembled in addition to the two other standard antennas. Only one SOI was carried and used to prepare the coded daily reports what were transmitted. No fragmentation grenades were carried and only two smoke grenades, one by both Grimes and myself. I carried the only signal mirror and a single VS17 air panel to assist in any emergency extraction. Several of us wore the 101st Recondo School taped soap dish containing sutures, morphine and other emergency medical items secured to our LBE harness. All members of the patrol had a wound piece of ‘550 chord’ secured to our harness with a 2000 pound tensile strength snap link.

SSG Grimes and I drove a jeep to Division G-2 where captured NVA equipment was stacked in front of the entrance. We were given a briefing that included descriptions of the area we were to patrol and the locations of suspected NVA regimental CPs. We were instructed to recommend and plot our routes and request for pre-arranged fire support after Grimes completed his low aerial reconnaissance of the area in an OH-13. Grimes and I returned to the Battalion area and tentatively selected the routes and observation points from the supplied topographic maps and aerial photographs. We gave the LRRP patrol members a warning order prior to Grimes performing the reconnaissance flight. Upon his return we discussed what he had observed and updated our information on the area but did not alter our intended routes. The entire patrol participated in the preparation of the operations order that was later given by SSG Grimes. There were no rehearsals performed and the time prior to departure was spent studying maps and checking equipment.

We were inserted about two hours before nightfall using one UH-1 that made only one descent and hover for unloading located near an active and believed to be safe farming area located about 2.5 km east of the area where we would be operating. The actual LZ was located north of the area at coordinates 48PYA554597 and this area had been evaluated for enemy activity during Grimes' observation flight and by the low level photo reconnnaissance performed by the Air Force. No enemy contact was anticipated and none were encountered. We moved rapidly into the tree covered mountains at the southern limit of the patrol area and proceeded northward along the border and through the night to our first observation and study area (hilltop 847) and arrived prior to BMAT. We had previously conducted numerous three day patrols, including those along the Cambodia border, where we had located and cleared a NVA Regimental CP and hospital; however the terrain had not been as steep but our navigation skills and physical conditioning enabled us to move quickly.

Movement, consisting of rapidly walking (routinely 3 km/hour)point to point routes for approximately 18 hours, was intended to be limited to late evening and night navigation with daily situation reports made in the early morning to airborne Air Force aircraft from positions selected on mountain tops that afforded the opportunity to observe long distances. Rising smoke from what was believed to be cooking fires was plotted on the topographic maps that we carried; however, the planned patrol route was not altered and these sightings were not evaluated from close range. We remained on well worn and narrow trails during most of the movements between observation points. We did not expect the enemy to establish ambush sites or set out mines and booby traps in these areas that were believed to be only occupied by NVA troops. On several occasions we discovered enemy boot prints at stream and trail junctions but not along the trail routes that we were following. We wore issued jungle boots and altered our routes to avoid trails having damp and soft surfaces where our boots would have made an impression in the soil. This was difficult to achieve during night movement but when I checked our trail when doubling back during temporary halts, we managed to do well at leaving no signs of our passing.

After about a week of patrolling, an emergency extraction was necessary when Tyler became unconscious with a malaria fever. At the risk of compromising our location, we requested a single UH-1 to a small tree lined hilltop where we used a rope hoist secured to Tyler’s snap link to lift him from a large rock outcropping to the skids of the hovering helicopter where the crew were able to grab and lift him onboard. After the aircraft departed, we moved quickly along a narrow trail down to a valley and up to another mountain ridge where we ‘lay-dogged’ until nightfall and then resumed our patrol as planned.

We were able to zig-sag along our planned routes and complete the daily observation reports from the pre-selected observation points. Close enemy observation was only made on the last day of the patrol where we were to be extracted by two UH-1s from an area located in the northern limits of the patrol area. Eight NVA were found gathering firewood with their rifles leaning against one tree. That encounter will be described in a separate writing.

We were extracted by two UH-1s from a LZ which we had occupied for the entire morning. The areas and trails leading into the LZ were reconned by different team members and we were certain that no enemy troops were within several miles of the LZ. The UH-1s arrived mid-day and on time and we dove aboard the helicopters and returned to base camp where we requested and were given ice cream, milk and different meals while we prepared our combined de-briefing report that was given by Grimes to G-2 and other division staff late that afternoon. No other LRRP members accompanied him. When he returned, he informed us that everyone was surprised that we had not become lost since the other six teams had more difficulty navigating. When he and I were alone, he asked, “Would you like to dye your skin brown, put on black pajamas and parachute into North Vietnam?” “We have a chance to be the first ‘Sting-Ray’ team.


Delta Company History (1965-66) A Division directed patrol to evaluate NVA communications in the late spring of 1966, by SGT J Conners, Chinese Bandit 13

I was informed by SSG Robert F. Grimes, Jr. (Acting Platoon Leader of the Recon Platoon) that my scout squad would conduct a three-day patrol in the mountainous area along the border south of the Dak Rolong river. He accompanied me to Division HQs where we received a briefing and were introduced to a 1LT communications officer that would be accompanying us during the operation. The LT was not assigned to the 1st Cav but to a unit based in the United States and would only be in country long enough to conduct the patrol and debriefings before returning Stateside. I do not recall his unit or where he was stationed. He had not received any special ranger type training but had a good attitude and willingness to get the job done.

The operations order, maps and aerial photographs that we received indicated that we would be inserted in the late evening near the border. We were to immediately move about 10 miles, initially westward and then southward along the border to a hilltop where the commo officer, using special communications equipment, would attempt to locate and monitor NVA radio traffic and determine if the NVA were using Soviet-block communications equipment that could locate our radios when transmitting and were capable of making our radios transmit when powered on and receiving. I was previously unaware that such technology existed and was in use by the Soviets. We were instructed to keep our radios powered on during the entire patrol and make two long situation reports, one in the morning and one in the evening prior to moving to the second hilltop located about 10 miles further south. Both hilltops overlooked valleys into Laos that contained expected NVA Regimental size CPs and provided line of sight between our radios and the NVA positions. We were directed to make one final transmission on the third day prior to moving to the extraction site located east of the border during the early morning hours. We were tasked to provide a pre-arranged fire plan that relied soley on TAC Air and gunships from the 1st Cav.

Grimes did not go on the patrol but assisted my scout squad in the planning and preparation for the patrol. He and I prepared the fire support plan after providing the first formal warning order to the patrol. The communications LT joined the patrol at our base camp in AnKhe and participated in warning and operations orders and rehearsals where it was necessary to provide him the appropriate clothing, LBE and rig his equipment to achieve the needed ‘silencing’. We practiced movement in the tree area behind the Mustang LZ opposite our tents until the LT was sufficiently proficient at moving quietly and coordinating his movements well with the other members of the patrol. The LT answered all of my technical questions on the special equipment he carried on a rucksack like frame suspended by shoulder straps. Frank Spickler, my scout squad team leader, and myself carried one small IR device, field binoculars and a set of maps and aerial photos. All members were provided and carried a single topographic map of a scale that covered the entire patrol route. Stevens, my RTO, was to carry his PRC-25 with antennas and SOI, and would follow me during movement. One of the other scouts carried a spare battery for the radio. Tyler would be on point, as usual, and in front of me during movement. The communications LT would follow Stevens and remain under my direct control. Frank chose Carley, without his M60, and Frank Cunningham as rear security. Cunningham had recently joined the scout squad as a replacement for C R Hatcher who had been killed at Bong Son. Cunningham had been levied from the 8th Infantry’s Long Range Patrol Company stationed in Germany. He had quickly adapted to our procedures and movement in the Central Highlands.

All members, except the communications LT, carried our normal LBE without rucksacks, and wore snap links with wrapped 550 chord for emergency rigging, and M16 rifles (without slings and taped for silencing). All wore our prized patrol caps with ‘merit badges’ and one was loaned to the LT for use during the patrol. LRRP rations were carried in the jungle fatigue pockets, three meals for three days. Most members carried jungle chocolate candy bars and would eat the paper wrappers (a LRRP tradition, if not it should be). No claymores or grenades and only two smoke grenades were carried. Our plan was to break contact and run if detected. Special rallying points were pre-selected and easily identified along the intended route. I also carried my 101st Recondo soap dish containing emergency medical supplies secured to my LBE harness, one VS17 air panel and signal mirror. All patrol members carried a military lensatic compass, except myself, who carried an M-2 compass. As usual, we chose to go lightly equipped, allowing rapid movement though the mountainous jungle.

We had developed many SOPs and did not practice them but spent three days preparing for the patrol by studying and memorizing the maps, aerial photos, routes and pre-planned fire locations; and at least one trip to Sin City to visit Bic Lin and our other favorites. The aerial photos contained excellent detail and I chose not to perform a recon flight of the area prior to insertion; however, Air Force low level photo missions were flown to provide current aerial photos one day prior to the insertion. All photographs and reports indicated that the NVA troop concentrations were not in the area where we would be working. Our actual route selections were chosen along trails that were clearly depicted in the aerial photographs and we intended to use them until human footprints or other indicators of human activity were encountered.

Two UH-1s arrived at the Mustang LZ where we boarded and were inserted about 30 minutes before EECT. We moved as planned to the first hilltop without any indication of enemy or human activity. The commo LT, my RTO and myself occupied a small open area on the hill where we positioned our communications equipment and antennas in line of site into Laos. Frank Spickler and the other patrol members occupied approximate pre-arranged positions further down hill adjacent to the trail leading to and from the hilltop. Tyler and Cunningham were at one location and Spickler and Carley at the other. Prior to splitting up, the IR device I carried was given to Cunningham. The two teams would use the IR equipment carefully during the night. Everyone shared the IR equipment to investigate any sound that usually revealed trailing ants, large black scorpions, snakes, or large mammals including tigers. The devices were powered by BA-30 batteries and transmitted an IR beam that could be seen with any IR receiver, a potentially dangerous piece of equipment if the enemy has IR receivers in use. The use of IR devices by the NVA was routinely included on the EEI list provided during the Division reconnaissance operations. To my knowledge none was detected or captured in our area of operations during the 1965 to early summer 1966 period.

LRRP rations were heated by adding water and placing the pouch against the chest between the body and the fatigue shirt. Water was obtained from the streams we crossed. No rain was anticipated and no rain gear was carried. Each person carried a single camouflage poncho liner in the small butt pack. The routine resting position during darkness consisted of leaning against a tree along the trail and wrapping the poncho liner around the back and shoulders, if a person needed it, with the M-16 cradled on your lap. During daylight hours the individuals moved further down hill, but remained close to the trail near a tree. Leeches were always a problem, not the larger aquatic species, but the small black damp soil types. Mosquito repellant was carried by most and used to remove the leeches that accumulated when moving through areas that were infested with them. We always adjusted our planned observation sites to avoid them. I encouraged the scouts not to use mosquito repellent or anything that had an odor that masked the natural smells of the jungle and the enemy. However, we all whimped out occasionally and put on liberal amounts of the repellent. Obviously smoking was banned and I discouraged the scouts from smoking even in base camp. Photographs taken in base camp, etc. of the era indicate that I was ignored.

The commo LT was unable to record NVA radio traffic and did not detect any enemy communications equipment attempting to locate our transmitter or activate our transmitter during the entire patrol. Our twice-daily SOI coded situation reports were transmitted to airborne aircraft that operated above us during transmissions.

We moved to the second hilltop as planned and did not detect any human activity and no enemy activity was observed on the other side of the border. We did encounter two wild elephants along the trail on the second day of movement.

We were extracted on the third day without any enemy contact and no injuries. The normal debriefing occurred after the patrol members consolidated all notes and memories. Notes were recorded on a small notebook using a wood lead pencil that was carried in the breast pocket by all team members. Many interesting topics were recorded in those booklets.

Grimes accompanied me to Division HQs where I gave the debriefing to a room of senior officers and NCOs. When I completed the briefing and stated, "The time is now, what are your questions?" the audience was most interested in the patrol’s physical well being and means of remaining undetected. I expressed my concerns that the boot imprint that we made warranted a special sole that resembled a human footprint or NVA style footgear. We had discussed this amongst the scouts for several months but had not attempted to have a pair made locally. After six months in country most of the scouts were very thin and most had malaria. Grimes and I looked very thin compared to others present and that became an issue of discussion that included our efforts to select persons having only relatively mild reactions to malaria. Medical doctors were present and a General grade officer ordered them "to look into that."

We returned to the company area at AnKhe and informed the patrol and other assembled scouts of what had occurred at the debriefing. It was obvious that we had accomplished another noteworthy achievement. I remembering feeling proud until George Conrad walked, no strutted, into our area wearing his captured NVA (or Chinese Advisor) belt and pistol. But that is a story that can only be told by Conrad.

I do not recall believing this to be a LRRP patrol and we did not call it such. We conducted many two and three-day operations, often distant enough to be beyond the range of any fire support other than aerial. The patrol was special and remains a high light in my military experience. I mailed my green memo booklet describing this operation home to my brother and Father but efforts to locate the booklet have been unsuccessful. My notes included sunbathing on the hilltop wearing only my issued tan diving trunks that I occasionally wore under my jungle fatigues. My Father felt that was inappropriate...ex-WWII-Korea-JUSMAG and he told me so when I came home a few months later. He has significantly more combat time, decorations and purple hearts, therefore, I don’t argue with him.


Delta Company History (1965-66)

Recon 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav trained Korean Ranger officers in late Spring 1966 and working with a Japanese television team

Korean Ranger officers were temporarily assigned to Recon 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav for the purpose of gaining patrolling experience in the Central Highlands. A captain of the Korean Rangers was introduced to the 3d Scout Squad, Chinese Bandit 13, immediately prior to our being given a warning order that indicated he would be assigned and allowed to participate in all aspects of the mission.

We were to be inserted early the following morning using two UH-1s about 30 miles northwest of AnKhe and move another 10 miles by foot before establishing an ambush site that was to be occupied overnight; and then another overland movement eastward during the day until about midnight where we were to establish another ambush site; and then extracted by helicopters at mid-day from a LZ located about 10 miles south.

The Korean captain observed our preparations which consisted primarily of map and aerial photo studies and work associated with giving both the warning and operation orders. When we performed our final equipment inspection he was assisted by PFC Terry Stevens, the scout squad RTO, who provided additional LBE and other needed gear. The captain wore tiger-like fatigues and was armed only with a pistol and k-bar type knife. He never spoke and only nodded. I had been told that he spoke and wrote fluent English. I did not ask him any questions and only gave him simple instructions that he followed.

He was told to report the following morning, early and that we would have one last briefing prior to our departure from LZ Mustang located near the Recon 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav tents at AnKhe. He departed the area in the late afternoon and did not report the following morning.

We implemented the mission without enemy contact and only recovered several NVA propaganda pamphlets during the last day of the operation. We were not debriefed which was unusual. When I inquired on the Korean captain, the acting platoon leader, SSG Grimes stated that we had offended him in some manner and that he had decided not to participate further.

On another occasion, we were assigned a Japanese television team that was to record our patrolling near the Cambodian border. We were inserted and began movement in the hills along the border before they decided to cancel the filming and requested that we take them back.

I regret that both experiences did not get completed as planned. Having the film of our patrolling would be something of interest to all Chinese Bandits. The Korean Ranger was only several years older than I was and therefore, probably alive and may read this accounting. Would enjoy reading or hearing his description of the brief time he was honored to spend with the Chinese Bandits.


Delta Company History (1965-66) Combat/Reconnaissance Patrol of the Recon 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav during Operation Nathan Hale June 23, 1966

On July 19, 1966 the 2d Bn (ABN) 327th Inf, 101st Airborne Division conducted air assaults northwest of Tuy Hoa in the vicinity of Trung Luong Valley and encountered heavy resistance and casualties from battles with the 66th, 95th and 18th Regiments of the North Vietnamese Army 302d Division. B and C Companies of the 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav, 1st Cav Division were inserted to reinforce the 2/327 Inf on June 20. B Co 1/8th Cav linked up with B Co 2/327 Inf in the morning on June 21 in the vicinity of LZ Eagle. The two airborne battalions experienced continuous attacks, including hand to hand combat, and inflicted heavy losses on the two NVA attacking battalions. One wounded NVA company commander was captured from the area in front of the rifle companies and reported his unit had been annihilated and the other NVA units had begun to withdraw on the evening of June 22d.

On June 22, Recon 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav (Chinese Bandits) were extracted from reconnaissance operations being performed in Kontum Province and airlifted to Tuy Hoa airport and placed under the operational control of the 1st Bn 9th Cav, 1st Cav Division. At 0530, 23 June, the Chinese Bandits Recon Platoon and one Recon Platoon of the 1/9th Cav were inserted into separate landing zones southwest of LZ Eagle to regain contact with the one of the withdrawing NVA forces. The sun was shining and the weather dry and combat engagement was anticipated so the ranger patrol caps were stowed and helmets donned as the Bandits approached and then exited the helicopters on the tree lined hilltop LZ. Both landing zones were located adjacent to wide, ox cart size, trails that led to the higher hilltops where several hundred of the NVA 66th Regiment were believed to be occupying. The Bandit LZ was located along the ridgeline approaching the expected enemy position and the 1/9th Recon LZ was located further downhill in a draw on the Bandit’s left flank.

The Bandits moved along the ridge line trail and at mid-morning, point man PFC Raymond Carley observed a NVA size squad moving towards them and away from the 1/9th Recon Platoon which was proceeding along the lower trail towards the intersection of both trails. Carley and three others moved into a position ahead in the vicinity of coordinates CQ 958626 where they were able to kill three of the fleeing NVA before the remaining NVA, wearing khaki uniforms and some tan helmets, retreated further uphill.

The Bandits continued up hill along the trail with Carley now opting to carry the new AK47 that he had removed from one of the NVA and having given his own M16 and ammunition to the medic assigned to Recon. Anticipating a main NVA force to be occupying the intersection of the trails being used by the Bandits and the 1/9th Recon Platoon, the 25 man Chinese Bandit force advanced slowly along both sides of the trail while listening to the voices and sounds of the NVA preparing positions along the ridgeline ahead. Carley continued uphill ahead of the other Bandits until he located the first enemy positions and machinegun along the left side of the trail where the Bandits began to move into combat positions amongst the small and sparsely treed locations below the NVA. A second machinegun position was located on the right side of the trail and moments later a third NVA machinegun opened fire and the Bandits exchanged small arms fire (rifle, machinegun, and grenades) for several minutes as they attempted to advance and attack the NVA force.

Operating without orders, SP/4 Frank Spickler, team leader of the 3d Scout Squad, immediately ran forward to assist Carley and those engaging the most concentrated NVA force located in the vicinity of coordinates CQ 962618 where he observed Carley laying along the trail about 30 feet in front of the nearest NVA position. Carley had been shot several times and although alive, he was unable to crawl clear of the withering fire. Spickler moved closer and avoided detection by the NVA until he attempted to cross the trail and pull Carley to safety. Heavy enemy fire prevented Spickler from advancing and he withdrew a short distance to obtain the assistance of other Bandits located near him. Spickler positioned one of the scouts in a location where the scout could provide suppressing fire during his effort to move Carley. Leaving his rifle with the other Bandits, Spickler again moved into position near Carley, he dashed towards him, dropping to a low craw when the NVA fired on him and then rolling near Carley, he was able to hoist Carley on his back and quickly dragged him towards the side of the trail. During this attempt, Spickler felt the impact of bullets entering Carley. Once clear of the most intense fire, Spickler carried Carley to the medic who was already treating several, but less wounded Bandits.

During his second attempt to retrieve Carley, Spickler had located SGT James Lester lying less than ten feet from where Carley had been laying. Again acting without orders, Spickler returned to the area in front of the enemy’s position where he low crawled under fire and dragged the much heavier Lester clear of direct enemy fire.

The Recon Platoon of the 1/9th Cav had quickly advanced along the wide trail located in the draw and came alongside the left flank of the Chinese Bandits, where both Recon Platoons unsuccessfully attempted a coordinated attack in an effort to over run the NVA positions located near the intersection of both trails.

MSG Johnson, acting platoon leader of the Chinese Bandits, directed Spickler to move forward to a position between the lead scouts and the NVA and mark the position with smoke grenades. All available indirect fire mortars and artillery were positioned to support the other elements of the 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav and the 2d Bn (ABN) 327th Inf and only ARA equipped gunships were able to provide supporting fires. Spickler remained in position, marking the enemy lines while the gunships continually attacked the NVA located in front of the two Recon Platoons and on the higher hill tops for about thirty minutes. One gunship pass was made ‘danger close’ resulting in a 2.75-inch FF aerial rocket exploding and injury several Bandits, including SSG Robert Grimes, the 1st Scout Squad Leader and acting Platoon Sergeant.

The NVA withdrew further uphill allowing the two Recon Platoons to carry their killed and wounded scouts along the side of the lower trail that had been used by the Recon Platoon of the 1/9th Cav. However, as darkness fell, another large NVA force resumed the attack and pursued the wounded men of both Recon Platoons as they made their way towards the LZ designated for extraction. Small fire fights occurred thoughout the night resulting in further Bandits being wounded. Approaching the LZ which was secured by other troops from the 3d Brigade, 1st Cav Division, in the early morning light, medivac helicopters arrived and both Recon Platoons were airlifted to a field medical station that had been located along Highway One. The bodies of Chinese Bandits PFC Raymond Carley and Sergeants James Lester and Honorio Ramirez and the other many wounded Bandits were left with the medics, doctors and nurses. The remaining Chinese Bandits rejoined the 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav and commenced patrolling in the area SW of LZ Eagle on June 26, 1966.

This description of the actions taken by Carley and Spickler is only one of the many efforts made by the scouts of both Recon Platoons and warrant being written in recognition of those that fought that day on June 23, 1966. Efforts are underway to post the other detailed descriptions of those engagements on the Recon LRRP Team 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav homepage.

Raymond Carley, our youngest Chinese Bandit, is buried at Fort Rosecrans National Cemetery in San Diego County, California; Frank Spickler was awarded the Bronze Star with V Device (something that remains a source of irritation after forty years…it was initially discussed that he was to be given the Distinguished Service Cross); and Recon 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav was awarded its SECOND Presidential Unit Citation for valor. 101st Recondo Spickler was later shot in the lung while serving as the Platoon Sergeant of the 3d Platoon, C Company, 2d Bn (ABN) 501st Infantry, 101st Airborne Division and unable to remain on jump status and later left the military in 1970.

The 1965-66 Chinese Bandits were to remain a fighting airborne Recon Platoon with its LRRP Team performing extended long range reconnaissance operations along the borders of Laos and Cambodia until November 1966 when they were disbanded having lost most of its original NCOs and scouts.

Extracted from written statement made by Duke Barrett and interviews with Frank Spickler and others serving with the Recon 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav on June 23, 1966; and the official after action reports of the 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav, and 2d Bn (ABN) 327th Infantry.

Historical footnote: Nathan Hale (June 6, 1755 – September 22, 1776) was a captain in the Continental Army during the American Revolutionary War. Hale is best remembered for his “I only regret that I have but one life to lose for my country" speech before being hung following the Battle of Long Island. An account of his capture was written by Consider Tiffany, a British Loyalist, and obtained by the Library of Congress. In Tiffany’s account, Major Robert Rogers of the Queens Rangers (“Rogers Rangers”) was the individual responsible for his capture and personally apprehended him. More information can be obtained reference Nathan Hale’s capture in the Library of Congress Information Bulletin-July-August 2003 on line at http://www.loc.gov/loc/lcib/0307-8/hale.html





Delta Company History (1965-66) Pathfinder Assignments Recon LRRP Team 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav Operation Jim Bowie March 13, 1966

MSG Johnson had returned from the hospital after being evacuated for malaria in late November 1965 and resumed his duties as Acting Platoon Leader and Platoon Sergeant of the Chinese Bandit Recon Platoon. SSG Robert Grimes stepped down from the job and resumed his duties as the 1st Scout Squad Leader; SSG Terry Lawson remained the 2d Scout Squad Leader, a position he had held since he arrived with the advanced party in the late summer of 1965; and SGT Jerry Conners was the current 3d Scout Squad Leader during the patrolling that occurred in early March in the area east of Kontum.

Returning from a patrol east of An Loa Valley, SGT Conners was notified that the Battalion would be inserted into a larger LZ where the battalion less C Company would assault and that the 3d Scout Squad was tasked to provide Pathfinder support during the insertion at LZ Columbus (coordinates BR 653868). Regiments of the NVA Sao Vang division were believed to be operating and staging supplies in the area.

Maps and aerial photographs were provided early in the afternoon and the battalion S-3 provided details of the air transport and landing phases of the assault which was to begin the next morning. The landing zone could accommodate eight UH-1s and was level but surrounded by trees and located at the base of a large hill. SGT Conners and his Scout Squad planned the landing zone layout and determined that two light sets were sufficient to properly mark the LZ which would initially be occupied by the entire Chinese Bandit Recon Platoon which were to be inserted at one time using seven UH-1s. The sets were contained in rucksacks and did not arrive until dark. The 3d Scout Squad checked the lights and VS-17 air panels and repacked the equipment in the rucksacks. Late in the evening, MSG Johns and the three scout squad leaders presented the diagram for the LZ layout to the S-3 and other battalion staff and company commanders.

At 0500 hrs on March 13, 1966 the Chinese Bandits boarded the UH-1s with the 3d Scout Squad occupying the first two helicopters, with one light set on each. Thirty minutes later they approached LZ Columbus with a south final approach heading. The Recon platoon took up assigned positions encircling the LZ with the 3d Scout Squad securing the most southern section where the VS 17 panels and lights were quickly placed and anchored. No enemy contact was made during the insertion.

Twenty-four helicopters from the 227th Assault Helicopter Battalion would make three sorties to insert first B Co 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav and then A Co. Prior to the B Company’s insertion specific areas were subjected to ARA and tactical air preparations and the first eight aircraft began to land around 0600 hours. Frank Spickler, Chinese Bandit 13 team leader occupied the area immediately behind the VS-17 panels and provide arm and hand signals to the approaching lead aircraft while Terry Stevens, the 3d Scout Squad RTO provided radio communications from the tree line behind the panels. These men had been performing pathfinder support since their assignment to the original 11th Air Assault Recon Platoon that had been assembled at Ft. Benning. The white lights delineating the LZ boundaries were too dim for the light conditions and provided little value but did assist the pilots is maintaining formation on landing. The few red lights marking the obstacles on the LZ were brighter and provided the avoidance information for which they were intended.

B Company was inserted and secured portions previous held by one of the two other Chinese Bandit Scout Squads which repositioned to an area located in the southeast corner of the LZ that was to be used to stage the initial Chinese Bandit patrol assembly area.

A Company began arriving about 0730 hours. The second group of eight aircraft approached the LZ normally until the lead left aircraft swerved abruptly, yawed left and right while about twenty feet above the ground, then rolled about 30 degrees to the left and descended. The helicopter main rotor blades struck the ground at about the same time that the left side of the helicopter. The blades broke free and flew through the air where many of the A Company troops were moving to their assembly areas.

SGT Conners instructed Stevens to alert the other approaching aircraft and yelled to SSG Grimes to have his RTO notify the battalion commander using the battalion command net. He than ran towards the downed helicopter with another red light and stood near it and assisted in adjusting the landing of the remaining aircraft.

No enemy had been detected or rifle fired heard since the initial insertions. Medics and others worked feverishly to treat those most severely wounded. One man had both legs cut off and required the attention of several to stop the bleeding, others were crushed and the flying rotor blades had caused other severe cuts to legs and arms. The door gunner was killed and another trooper was paralyzed. Medivac helicopters arrived about thirty minutes after the accident and the injured and dead gunner were evacuated. The final battalion insertion occurred about 1000 hours and the landing zone setup was left to the rifle companies while the 3d Scout Squad joined the other scout squads that were assembled in the southeast corner of the LZ.

As previously planned, the 3d Scout Squad passed through the assembly area and proceed to lead the Chinese Bandit patrol up the mountain through the trees towards the top of the hill. No trails had been located and the Chinese Bandits moved quickly up the steep hill. Near the top the point team lead by Louis Tyler stopped when they heard voices above and north of them. Big Hall, the second member of the point team, returned downhill and informed SGT Conners of the situation. Stevens notified those on the battalion intelligence net of the enemy contact ahead while SGT Conners proceeded ahead after instructing the squad to “hold until you are told otherwise”.

SGT Conners lay alongside the two members of the point team and listened to the voices that were coming from the hill top area about one hundred feet away. The hilltop was also covered in tall trees. SGT Conners instructed the point team to “Remain here, I’ll be back” and quickly advanced in a low crouch while carefully moving from tree to tree. Coming to a trail that ran along the ridgeline, SGT Conners examined the trail that was covered with fresh human footprints, some were barefoot and some were boot marks. Moving closer he observed several khaki clothed troops talking loudly and digging in the dirt. Shallow holes were everywhere and many troops could be heard moving away and down the opposite side of the hill. Conners moved towards those sounds and amongst freshly dug shallow trenches. He heard the sounds of approaching rounds and jumped into the nearest trench as the 105mm rounds impacted around him. White phosphorus first, then a volley of point detonating high explosive rounds. Friendly fire continued for about four minutes and SGT Conners wedged himself in the roots located in the trench as he began to pass out from lack of air and trying to prevent being lifted from the hole when the rounds detonated.

Most of the trees were down when Conners stood up and the area was covered in thick smoke. He ran back towards his point team where MSG Johnson was standing, grabbed Stevens and yelled, “Let’s go.” The entire 3d Scout Squad followed him to the opposite side of the hill where the last of the NVA were seen retreating in the drainage below him. “Fire Mission” he yelled to Stevens who was already on the fire net attempting to get the 105mm guns to cease-fire. Stevens gave a shift fire direction and the rounds began to fall in the drainage. MSG Johnson caught up with the Scout Squad and prevented the squad from further pursuing the NVA and instructed them to continue our original mission to patrol the ridgeline and rejoin the battalion at the LZ. We traveled north along the ridge and from several locations could see the LZ where we had inserted earlier.

Arriving back at the LZ, one of the medics picked a 3 inch long piece of metal from Conners’ LBE harness, a secondary fragment that had probably been deflected by the trees and had only enough force to embed in the harness, puncture the skin and create a large black and blue bruise that looked bad but wasn’t.

We all concluded that the helicopter had been hit by enemy small arms fire, but we were not informed of the results of the aircraft investigation or the reports from the pilot and copilot that survived the crash.


Delta Company History (1965-66) Chinese Bandit 12 SGT Rock Joe Musial...Recon is disbanded in late 1966 but Musial fights on...Extract from Reader’s Digest Story May 2002 regarding SGT Joe Musial, Chinese Bandit 12

“A Soldiers Story” by Robert Hodierne Maybe it was all the images of war that filled my TV and newspapers this past fall. But for some reason, for the first time in many months, I began staring at a photo that hangs on my office wall.

It was taken 35 years ago. In the picture, an Army sergeant is on his belly, pinned down by enemy fire, looking grim and determined. In the foreground is a dead GI, in the background, a seriously wounded one. The person behind the lens that day was me: a skinny young civilian war photographer experiencing his most terrifying day in Vietnam.

I have relived that firefight countless times. It wasn't my first battle experience, but that day, on the Bong Son plain in Vietnam's central lowlands, it felt like the North Vietnamese were shooting at me. Burst after burst kicked sand in my face. I remember wondering what odds I had of living through it.

I remember also that sergeant crawling out into the killing zone, inching toward his dead comrade to retrieve his grenade launcher. Was he nuts? That's when I took the photo.

The photo has faded into the background -- become like wallpaper -- over the years, but I've always given it a prominent place in various offices and dens. If anyone asked why I had it on the wall, I'd joke: "To remind me that no matter how bad things get here, at least people aren't shooting at me."

When I began gazing again at the picture last fall, I started wondering about that hard-luck sergeant. How many more firefights had he endured? Did he even survive the war? Strange how one terrifying day could bond me to a virtual stranger, but it had. I decided to try to find him, see how his life had turned out.

I posted my photos from that battle on the Internet, along with queries to Army alumni websites. Did anyone who was with the 1st Air Cavalry Division remember that Valentine's Day fight? I wrote. Did anbody recognize the soldiers I'd snapped that day at Bong Son?

Within days my phone rang and George Goswick was on the line. "Everyone called me Baby Huey," he said by way of introduction. Goswick, of Adairsville, Ga., had been a radio operator in the 1st Cav. "I know who that sergeant is in your photo," he said. "That's Sergeant Rock. Joe Musial."

Goswick told me Musial had been well known by everyone. "He liked to fight with officers," Goswick said with a chuckle. Apparently Musial had been one of those peacetime garrison screwup types. By 1966, when he was shipped to Vietnam, he'd be in uniform for 12 years and was just a Specialist 4. Draftees with less than a year in the Army outranked him.

The next phone call told me that Musial's story didn't end on the Bong Son plain. Bret Barham, 54, is now an assistant district attorney in Jennings, La. But in 1968, Barham was a 21-year-old sergeant in the 1st Cav in Vietnam. "Rock was an absolute legend in our battalion," Barham told me. "I can remember guys in other units, when Rock walked around the perimter, they'd stare and ask, 'Is what they say about him true?'" And what they said about him, I learned, was that Joe Musial was the real deal. He was a hero.

Roger McDonald, 66, of Cartersville, Ga., filled me in on the metamorphosis of Joe Musial. McDonald was a 1st Cav Recon platoon sergeant and a buddy of Musial's from stateside. In 1966, McDonald was leading a reconnaissance platoon in Vietnam, 30 or 40 men who would be dropped by chopper deep in hostile territory. The sergeant sought out his old pal, Joe Musial. "I said, 'You want to join recon?'

The Valentine's Day battle I photographed was one of Musial's first. His bravery in that fight went pretty much unnoticed by the Army. There were no medals won that day. But Musial went on to serve two more tours in Vietnam, leading recon patrols and infantry platoons, and by the time it was all over, he wasn't Joe Musial anymore. He was Sergeant Rock.

Nobody could remember when he first got tagged with the name of the World War II comic book character. But everyone knew how he earned it.

In August 23, 1968, Musial's troops were surprised by a far larger enemy force. North Vietnamese machine gunners began ripping rounds into their position. Musial didn't duck for cover. He charged forward under heavy fire, flinging grenades at the machine-gun nest, destroying it. That day Joe Musial earned his first Silver Star.

He was awarded a second Silver Star for his actions on March 21, 1969, defending an obscure little outpost called Landing Zone White. North Vietnamese Army sappers -- explosive experts -- had broken through the perimeter and were throwing charges into bunkers crowded with GIs. Musial, out in the open helping wounded troops, spotted three sappers. Armed only with a pistol, Musial shot two before the third one tossed his charge. Bits of shrapnel tore into Musial's flesh, but he stood his ground and gunned down the third attacker.

His buddies came to revere him, yet knew all too well the pugnacious side of Rock that couldn't be suppressed. One night, away from the front, Musial got drunk and picked a fight -- as usual, with someone who outranked him. That episode cost him a stripe. "We had this great fear he'd get busted again and we'd end up outranking him," Barham said. "We'd have followed him anywhere, but we knew he wouldn't follow us."

And follow Musial they did: into enemy villages erupting with rifle fire, down booby-trapped trails, into dark caves where Musial insisted on entering first, alone. By war's end, the screwup cook had amassed not just two Silver Stars, but three Bronze Stars and three Purple Hearts. Perhaps the greatest tribute, though, came from his 1st Cav comrades. It was the tradition in that division to name chopper landing zones and other outposts after men who'd died in combat. But they decided to name one after a living man: LZ Rock.

A few of the veterans told me that if I wanted to meet Musial, I had better make it soon. The guy who'd survived so much in Vietnam was now in the VA hospital in Battle Creek, Mich., dying of lung cancer. I called Musial, who said he'd be happy for the visit, so I made the ten-hour drive from my home in Washington, D.C.

When I walked into the hospice room, a 65-year-old man looked up at me, an oxygen bottle tethered to him. But there was a roguish twinkle in those sunken eyes, and I could see the ghost of that young sergeant.

"Oh, I remember you," he said immediately. "You were bored because there hadn't been any action." We both laughed.

I put before him my battle photos. "God, I was young," he said. "But I don't remember these other guys. There were so many."

His first major fight, he recalled, come on December 28, 1966. He'd led his platoon into the village of Gia Duc when Viet Cong opened fire. "That was a bad day," he said. He earned one of his Bronze Stars there, but that's not what pricks his memory. It's Skip Baumann, a 20-year-old private. "He kept getting up to see them and I said, 'Get down!' And God darn it, he got hit. I got him and was holding him." Musial paused to use his oxygen. "The reason I remember him so well is his last question. 'Am I good soldier?' he asks. I said, 'Hey, you're a great soldier, you're the top. You're airborne.' And, of course, he passed away."

We talked a bit about the Valentine's Day ambush and I told him that some of his men said he should have gotten the Medal of Honor for LZ White. Musial shrugged. He wasn't having any of the hero stuff.

I spent most of the day with Musial, during which he told me about his life after the war: how he went to work on oil rigs in the the Gulf of Mexico; how he lost his right leg in an accident there; and how, with his Army pension and a settlement from the oil company, he'd bought a house on 35 rural acres in southwest Michigan. "That place was his paradise," his sister, Eugenia Zelas, told me later. "That's where he found peace."

Joe and I never talked about the fact that he was dying. When I shook his hand and left, we promised to meet at a 1st Cav reunion next June. We both knew he wouldn't make it.

On the drive home, I couldn't get out of my head something that Bret Barham had told me. "In Vietnam, Rock was doing what he was designed by God to do -- be a warrior. I always said he should have been frozen and put under glass with a sign that said, 'In case of war, break.'

I put Joe's picture back up at home. Battles raged live on the TV screen, while Rock's war -- and mine -- sat frozen in time in a small frame.

Then the call came on a chilly afternoon. Joe Musial, Sergeant Rock, died in the early morning hours of November 11, 2001. Veterans Day.

This story appeared originally in the May 2002 Reader's Digest.


Delta Company History (1965-66)

Night Movement and Tracking Techniques along the Northern Border of Cambodia by Ranger Jerry Conners, Chinese Bandit 13…Spring 1966 DOD/MACV/OP-35 directed Long-Range Reconnaissance Operations

The Chinese Bandits had been performing extended patrolling operations since their arrival in Vietnam in the fall of 1965 and our SOP’s, including mission preparations, had become routine as our teamwork constantly improved. Warning and operations orders were routinely given, however only some priority pre-insertion rehearsals, refresher training and other preparations were performed and were primarily focused on suspected enemy and indigenous population location reports, area studies, route navigation and night movement techniques.

The tentative routes had been planned for night-only movement that would take place primarily along the ridgeline border of Cambodia or Laos and Vietnam with several routes extending eastward into small valleys and the adjacent hilltops. Contrary to policy, the routes and other critical control points were plotted in black pencil directly onto the topographic maps that we would be carrying. Small penlight flashlights having a red tinted lens were carried by all team members and would be used to read and analyze the maps during periods of darkness when necessary.

A small wooded area was located near our Mustang LZ at An Khe where we were billeted in tents. This tree area was used to conduct rehearsals and other refresher patrol training exercises.

For a few hours on the day and night prior to the long-range reconnaissance mission, the Chinese Bandit LRRP team conducted refresher drills to improve our track perception skills of on trail and off trail terrain. The drill that was the most beneficial required each man to assume the front leaning rest position with their arms and hands extended in a manner which formed a small square opening between both hands when the thumb tips met and were held perpendicular to the main body axis while the other fingers were oriented parallel. After examining the area between the hands for one minute, each person would mark the limits of the square while kneeling on one knee after removing the small green colored Memorandum booklet and short wood lead pencil from their breast pocket and attempt to sketch what was observed in the square solely relying on their memory of what was observed. We would critique each individual sketch and strived to detect any missing details that were observed but not sketched. During those drills that were conducted in darkness, the prone positioned was omitted but the hand orientation used to delineate the square area that was observed while kneeling where the penlight flashlight was used to illuminate the area being evaluated and sketched.

I had been shown this drill as a child while training with German Boy Scouts during a scout jamboree held in the black forest and had observed for ten years that everyone subjected to the sketching drill improved to detect more details with practice. Most persons failed to detect a majority of the clearly delineated details within the area being observed during their first attempts. Even relatively undisturbed flat and seemingly feature-less terrain typically contained large amounts of information that was detected and sketched only after practicing in a variety of terrain, light and weather conditions. Indentations, scratches, texture, colors, moisture content, plant, animal and microbial matter, rain drops, etc. were only observed and sketched with practice.

In my patrol cap I carried a flexible 12-inch straight edge fabricated from a 2-inch wide strip of thin sheet metal that had issued luminescent taped fixed to one side. The tape was the same material that was used for the markers sewn on the back of our patrol caps. Several others carried the same device that was used to detect depth changes during light and darkness when the straight edge was placed horizontal along the surface being evaluated. During darkness the faint shadows created by the luminescence revealed details that the brighter red light did not and any variation in depth below the straight edge was more evident. Black permanent ink was used to mark twelve inches with halve and quarter inch increments. The scale was used to measure the dimensions of tracks and various items, including wildlife droppings and spent ammunition casings. Longer measurements, such as the distance between tracks, was measured using the luminescent notches made on a walking stick inlaid with foxfire and notched carvings.

The captured NVA rucksack that I carried had several modifications that included extending the pack straps to provide a more comfortable fit and enhanced ease of movement; and a section of a shelter half was sewn on the upper frame of the pack forming a cape which was large enough to extend over my head and provide a tent above any trail that was being examined during the darkness when lighting was used. This procedure provided concealment of the lighting and improved the lighting control that was needed to create the shadowing required to detect details. A local Vietnamese tailor whose shop was located near the newly established “Sin City” at An Khe had made the pack modifications. He made several other items for the Chinese Bandits including the special 40mm bandoleers.

Since our arrival in country, I had many opportunities to examine the trails and off trail areas where while kneeling over the site being examined, the rucksack would be allowed to slide forward to the back of my head, allowing me to easily grab the cape and pull it over my head and cover the trail. I would then remove my patrol cap and the luminescent straight edge and penlight. The luminescent tabs on the back of the cap were also used to create faint shadows when needed.

Night movement required excellent night vision that demanded a diet containing beta-carotene and Vitamin A. We were concerned that the single LRRP dehydrated ration that we consumed every other day might not provide sufficient amounts of nutrients to optimize night vision and we augmented our diet with the consumption of a variety of green grasses. The soft stems that were pulled from the nodes were the only part of the plant eaten. Although, no tests were performed to confirm the night vision value of the grass consumption, we did not experience night blindness or noticeable night vision decreases after prolonged patrolling. The soft grass stems did not cause observed digestive problems and were filling. One ‘Jungle Chocolate’ candy bar was also consumed daily by each man and the wild fruits were frequently found in the mountainous areas along the border. Extreme dysentery and bouts with malaria adversely effected night vision performance. Every effort was made for every man to remain in the field and complete the long-range reconnaissance missions along the border; however, men weakened by disease or other debilitating did not perform tracking and other critical duties. On only one occasion was one of the LRRP team members evacuated. Louis Tyler had lost consciousness and we were unable to control the fever that was the result of malaria. He was evacuated by helicopter from a small clearing in the forest that required modifying our route plans and increased the likelihood of our being detected. Tyler’s night vision had severely diminished earlier and he was unable to track but merely follow closely behind another patrol member.

At least six weeks was routinely required for an individual’s body to adjust to the environments of SE Asia and for the initial effects of amebic dysentery and malaria to subside. However, disease and illness was expected to flare up at intervals where persons were expected to function marginally. The Chinese Bandit LRRP Team was comprised of individuals that did not exhibit strong reactions to the diseases experienced in SE Asia. Malaria tolerance in the local population was well documented and it was believed that some otherwise healthy American troops exhibited this same tolerance.

Alcohol also diminishes night vision performance and a policy of not drinking alcoholic beverages three days prior to patrols was adopted. Smoking was believed to also have an adverse impact on night vision but was primarily prohibited for reasons related to general health and decreases to the sense of smell. Alcohol and tobacco consumption restrictions were not adhered to by half of the LRRP team members. I regret not enforcing these rules and at the time only chose to lead by example.

Chewing tobacco was not done during patrols. Spitting along the route would have made it easier to be followed. Our military issued jungle boots and use of walking sticks left distinctive markings that were easily followed unless individual patrol members exercised the necessary precautions. On trail movement was not routinely permitted when the trail surface was easily marked as was the case in soft or muddy conditions. Many areas along our route such conditions were encountered and provided the opportunity for the NVA to leave tracks whereas we did not. During the spring and early summer of 1966, we did not detect any efforts by the NVA to minimize making tracks on trails but made use of camouflage during movement and in their bivouac sites. It is also my belief that their tracking techniques were not exhaustive and unless obvious telltale signs were left, the NVA would not detect our presence nor be successful in their attempts to locate us.

Camouflage sticks were never carried and not used since it was believed that prolonged contact with the skin caused infantigo-like infections and the odor masked the natural smells of the environment. Some team members did carry red, black and yellow pastel sticks that were intended to be applied as war paint. Although we had opted to carrying limited weapons and equipment, many of us would not abandon the pastel sticks that had no intended use on a reconnaissance operation where contact was to be avoided at all cost. One of SLA Marshall’s books contains a reference to the fact that the Chinese Bandits did not wear camouflage ‘paint’. Jungle ‘rot’ sores were prevented only from frequent stream crossing baths and a constant effort to keep clean using only the available abundance of fresh water. Several photos were taken while in the rear areas that depict members wearing camouflage paste, however, the material was always removed to prevent the infections.

Prior to occupying our observation sites during the last several hours of night movement, the LRRP team moved only off trail to minimize being followed; however since anyone following the team for any period of time would have easily concluded that we were following the ridge line trail along the border. This was one of the reasons that we occasionally changed directions and moved into the valleys and occupied hilltop observation points east of the border.

I did carry a set of tight fitting black tennis shoes that had the flat and featureless soles that were commonly worn by most NVA. The larger length of the shoe did not allow indiscriminate movement but did optimize my ‘counter tracking’ efforts. We did request and the military did produce military boots with NVA shoe and human print soles. We did not receive these boots in 1966 but I have read of their later use in Vietnam and have received personal correspondence from some of those that used them indicating that the boot design was not without its own problems. Another thing that I would have changed in our Chinese Bandit LRRP Team uniform was the use of an NVA-like tennis shoe. It is also my understanding that some LRRP teams later wore such tennis shoes. During my Special Forces training prior to my assignment to the Chinese Bandits, I had been briefed on the frequent TDY uniform of many Special Forces teams operating in foreign countries that consisted of dark sweat shirts, blue Levis and local tennis shoes. I regret not adopting the use of a local tennis shoes SOP, albeit locating a sizes of the normal American foot size took a concentrated effort.

The Chinese Bandits wore a mixture of uniforms including standard issue jungle fatigues, WWII vintage M42 jungle camouflage fatigues with the metal thirteen star buttons, and tiger fatigues. I normally wore one of my father’s M42 jungle camouflage fatigues. I had brought two pairs to Vietnam in 1965 and preferred the jacket having the “JUSMAAG” scroll patch on the upper left arm. Both pairs were treated with the stock water repellant that was issued to all companies but rarely used. SSG Robert Grimes preferred and only wore tiger fatigues on long-range reconnaissance operations. The remainder of the team normally wore the standard jungle fatigues and jungle boots; however several of the shorter members wore various items of captured NVA clothing on occasion.

The small black leeches seem to prefer attaching to the skin in areas where clothing covered the body. I also carried and frequently wore a pair of issued khaki combat swimming trunks and would don the shorts and remove my shirt when leech infested areas were encountered. The tennis shoes and ‘shorts only’ dress would have appeared similar to that worn by indigenous personnel who occasionally hunted in the mountains and when observed for a distance had the advantage of appearing non-military. It was not uncommon on long-range reconnaissance operations for me to remain in this form of casual dress for many days. The long-range reconnaissance patrols that we performed in the spring and early summer were not conducted under the monsoon rains and the shorts and tennis shoes were adequate and provided an optimized indigenous appearance. However, I did not recommend this uniform during NATO debriefings and took efforts to conceal that it was a sometimes-preferred means of dressing, especially in the damp ‘triple canopy’ mountainous terrain where leeches were often encountered. Since our movements were conducted primarily during hours of darkness, a level of tolerance was required for the mosquitoes. To my knowledge no other LRRP team members wore shorts during the operations along the border; however, they would have been permitted to do so and observed me wearing them during our daily reassemblies. I also regret not formally recommending this indigenous uniform for use in the central highlands during the dry season.

Night movement that incorporated tracking and counter-tracking objectives was the norm and sustaining a 3 km per hour movement rate was easily accomplished in the mountainous regions of the Central Highlands. We were lightly equipped and capable of moving during darkness 25 miles daily; however, the assigned mission areas often permitted moving at much slower rates and allowed for a more thorough search. Small active infrared observation devices were carried and used to examine trails for evidence of tracks and longer distance monitoring. The range of the IR light source was limited to about 50 yards that minimized its long-range applications; however, the opportunity to observe the night activity of animals, including insects, snakes and large mammals was enhanced and aided in keeping the user alert and interested in the nighttime surroundings. Many experiments were conducted using the small device in conjunction with the other luminescent tools to examine and evaluate the trail for tracks and other markings. The IR light source was removed from the IR monitoring unit and placed at different angles to provide detection of depressions or other trail disturbances and was beneficial in analyzing any nighttime situation.

In practice, our night movement normally involved evaluation of NVA tracks only at locations where tracks were anticipated. Trail junctions and routes near stream crossings and along muddy sections of the trail and all approaches into our daily observation positions were routinely examined whereas the majority of the route was not examined. Rest halts were never conducted but any possible sight, sound or smell that might indicate NVA contact was investigated which included examining the trail for tracks. It was not uncommon to hear the distinctive singsong voices in the distance and the smell of smoke and other human activity odors during our nighttime movements. Each discovery was evaluated from a distance and recorded in our Memorandum booklets and often plotted on the topographic maps.

In the spring and summer of 1966, we did not observe or anticipate the NVA to booby trap or establish ambush sites in the area that they considered as ‘no man’s’ land and the sole domain of the NVA. We took no precautions to detect mines or any other devices along the trail other than normal visual scanning that was often afforded during periods when star and moon light penetrated the trees and during our day light scouting in the areas near our assigned day time occupied observation points. It was also observed and widely reported that the NVA noise and light discipline was poor in all areas along the border. The Chinese Bandit LRRP Team had experienced a detect first success since early January and no information had been obtained that movement along the northern borders of Cambodia and southern Laos would encounter an increased level of NVA alertness or an improvement in their noise and light discipline.

Suspected regimental size CPs were plotted on the aerial photographs that we were provided during the early planning stages of each LRRP mission and updated with daily reconnaissance flights including that performed my the LRRP team leaders using OH-13 aircraft. Each trail leading into the suspected NVA sites was thoroughly evaluated for evidence of enemy usage.

One of the most important mission preparations was the conduct of a thorough map study by each individual team member and construction of the ‘sand table’. Each person was required to ‘spider overlay’ their individual topographic maps where a red colored lead pencil was used to trace down each ridgeline and finger to the intercept with the valley floor and a blue or green colored lead pencil was used to trace up the smaller valleys until intercepting the hilltops of the area that encompassing the first days movement after insertion. As this process was completed, the topographic map became a spider-like network of red and blue lines that gradual became denser. This same exercise was conducted to some degree during the daytime prior to each day’s night movement. The procedure assisted in visualizing the terrain in three dimensions and forced focus on the terrain along our intended routes. The subsequent daily routes were only partially delineated with the red ridgeline and valley traces.

Once each individual had satisfactorily completed their spider overlays, some members created a ‘sand table’ of the entire route. The table was created directly on the cleared ground near our tents at An Khe and consisted of one-foot equals two kilometers scaled squares that contained mounded dirt to outline the hilltops and valleys. The vertical scale was exaggerated but done in a manner that ‘line of sight’ could be visualized. Each observation and assembly point, including emergency escape assembly points, preplanned fire target and the expected NVA regimental CPs were marked using items cut out of paper. The table was large and did not contain the topographic detail of our spider overlay topographic maps. Mastery of topographic maps and terrain association was essential and required of each long-range reconnaissance patrol member and taught to all members of the entire Chinese Bandit Recon Platoon. Any Chinese Bandit that did not demonstrate the ability to 3D visualize topographic maps in the spider overlay and sand table exercises was not permitted to conduct long-ranger reconnaissance or combat operations. In addition, each man was expected to know the meaning of every mark and label on the topographic maps in use.

No ‘pace-counts’ were performed during night movement and persons were expected to have memorized the topography and other critical information of the entire day route prior to departing each day. Stevens, my RTO was also expected to be aware of his actual coordinate position, at all times, within six digits WITHOUT consulting his topographic maps. Stevens conducted map checks at all high and low ground points. He mastered this skill after only two months of effort and could call for a fire mission or provide approximate coordinates in the event of an emergency in a matter of seconds. He was the only person expected to be making map checks on a regular basis and no one was in a position to discuss their map location with him, including myself. When unexpected enemy or other critical sites were located, the positions were posted on each man’s topographic map. It was interesting to compare these plots with those of the other team members during the occupation of our daily observation positions. Any errors in plotting were resolved and corrected on each man’s topographic map. No actual overlays were used but all notes and plots were made directly onto each man’s map, although the procedure was in contradiction with normal security procedures, we did so to ease movement and minimize what was carried. The reconsolidated maps and notes that were submitted after each operation were placed over new maps and overlay paper was used during after action debriefings. The actual green Memorandum books and topographic maps were NOT submitted for examination and some of these documents survive today.

I sent one Memorandum book home to my father and younger brother that contained sections describing me following wild or escaped elephants for a day in addition to the other information that I recorded.

Again, these protocols were add odds with what was expected but the information was normally used and shared with the entire Chinese Bandit Recon Platoon and the information was deemed beneficial enough to warrant deviation from normal policy. I have no doubt that intelligence specialists will find fault with what we did. We deviated from dress uniform, communications and intelligence reporting and policies. Sometimes to achieve what was required in the most optimized manner, and at other times motivated only by our own zeal regarding collecting intelligence information at close quarters with the NVA.

Everyone understood the strategic and tactical importance of not being detected or leaving evidence behind that would alert the NVA to our operating in the area. Any increased vigilance on the part of the NVA operating along the border would have made ground reconnaissance operations significantly more difficult and dangerous. Although we were confident that we would not be discovered, three response plans were developed in the event the Chinese Bandit LRRP team was detected or suspected of being detected by the NVA or any other indigenous personnel.

In the event of detection resulting in the exchange of fire, our sole strategy was to immediately break contact and run rapidly to pre-designated assembly points that were located along the route. In the event that we did not successfully transmit our daily surveillance report and the report received by the overhead airborne Air Force aircraft, then a search and recovery operation was to be launched immediately in the area between our last reported position and the next scheduled reporting point. The search area was to be expanded to all areas along the route until the Chinese Bandit LRRP team was recovered or until the decision was made to abort the search and recovery efforts. Each man carried a VS-17 panel and signal mirror that would allow for the marking of extraction sites near each pre-designated assembly point. Breaking contact did not emphasize keeping the six team together but an ‘every man for himself’ approach. The LRRP team was normally spread over a distance of several miles. The team carried only one radio and the operator followed the LRRP Team leader and maintained a line of sight distance from him or closer as the situation required. The radio operator also responsible for initiating calls for fire support and maintained a constant awareness of the adjacent pre-planned fire missions that would be provided solely by aerial fire support. In the event of an attack, the radio operator would call for fire support while running to break contact and the Chinese Bandit LRRP Team leader was to make every effort to join his radio operator and move together towards the pre-designated assembly of their choice. All other team members normally were extended beyond line of sight distances and any effort at regrouping would have decreased the flexibility needed when evading any pursuing NVA troops.

In any situation where we were detected by the NVA or indigenous personnel but not fired upon or being pursued by them, then an effort was to be made to assemble the team and move together and coordinate for an extraction of the team. In either the detection scenarios, it was important for team members to assess any heard rifle or other small arms firing to determine if the firing was that of the NVA and if the fire was directed at one or more of the Chinese Bandits. Since the NVA were using some US and other foreign weapons during this period of the Vietnam War, merely hearing the sound of small arms fire and determining the weapons type by sound did not provide confirmation of detection or engagement. Although it was observed that the NVA rarely discharged weapons unless in an actual engagement, it was important that any Chinese Bandit LRRP Team member not assume that other members were engaged merely by the sound of weapons fire in the vicinity of the patrols route. We had the opportunity to make use of Air Force emergency radios that could have been carried by each member of the LRRP Team. We failed to take advantage of these radios that would have provided improved communications to coordinate the decisions for aborting missions and inter-team coordinations during critical situations.

It was believed that the threat of our detection was greatest by indigenous persons and not the NVA. Generally, the local population knew the area better and often hunted on and off trail areas. The discovery of off trail disturbances and any discarded items, intentional or otherwise, that we made during our movements could be expected to have been made by anyone moving and slowly stalking prey. We made many inquiries to determine if the local population were using the trails and hunting and gathering crops in the mountainous areas along the border and were informed that such activities were rare now with the large presence of NVA and Saigon backed forces frequenting the region. Our patrolling confirmed this assessment, however, we remained vigilant and concerned that any disturbances or debris left behind would be discovered by the local hunters and those collecting food from abandoned slash and burn fields and our presence reported to the NVA.

In 1965 and 1966, many of the local population where still hunting and carrying homemade crossbows and arrows; rifles made from steel pipe using a threaded cap at one end and a hole drilled near the rear having a spring loaded hinge which detonated a toy pistol cap… the pipe was normally mounted to a carved wooden stock and secured by wire; and vintage Japanese and other bolt action rifles and pistols. Boys and men of all ages actively hunted and fished in areas near any hamlet unless military units, any military unit, were operating in the area. The threat of booby traps was not yet a widespread problem and these local area hunters would reenter their hunting areas when the military units were believed to have departed. They wore a variety of clothing and were often barefoot. The older men often hunted large game, including elephants, barking deer, anteaters, and gibbons and monkeys. Monkey blood and whiskey was a ceremonial drink amongst many of the upland high peoples. One hunting technique involved occupying positions, often in trees, near watering areas, and shooting the animals at close range. Another method specific to gibbon hunting involved slow cross-county movement where gibbons were heard in the high trees and then shooting a female gibbon which was carrying her baby. The dead female was used for food and source of blood and the baby gibbon sold in the market place and often shipped to larger cities and abroad to traders and zoos. Locals also placed fish traps in the larger streams and rivers and frequently traveled to these locations and removed any fish that had been captured. These locations were especially well traveled and recorded on our maps as possible contact sites with the local populations.

These indigenous hunters were our greatest threat, not the NVA, and unless counter tracking methods were used and used well, then we would be detected or evidence of our being in the area detected after our extraction.

Fortunately I had hunted with the hill tribes of SE Asia prior to my assignment to the Chinese Bandits and my focus always including the effort to locate the local hunters, who were encountered on occasion and our detection by them was thought to have been avoided. I believed at the time and now that any special operations-like teams should spend a minimum of one month hunting with local populations in the area of operations or an adjacent country with a nearly identical environment immediately prior to conducting any long-range reconnaissance operations in a hostile area.

Waste disposal was stressed and necessary to minimize detection. Our waste disposal and minimization protocols included the following:

We consumed the wax paper wrapper of the 'jungle chocolate bars';
We only carried the dehydrated food portion of LRP ration and retained the plastic wrapper that was later used to package any items collected. The plastic bags were licked clean and filled with stream water again and drank to recover any nutrients;
We only carried one white plastic spoon that doubled as a vertical half rhombic antenna insulator (this antenna was for emergency use only)...airborne aircraft were on station above during scheduled transmissions...if the spoon broke than the parts were carried;
We carried only one toothbrush that was used often without paste or other cleaner. It was a common practice for persons to often keep the toothbrush in their mouths even after the sweet flavor of the paste was gone;
No soap or other personal hygiene items were carried or used. We regularly rinsed daily during the stream crossings and routes were partially selected to provide this opportunity;
Mosquito repellant was carried by some members but not permitted for use unless 'approved'...the small black leeches were often left in place...many deviated from this policy;
No extra clothing (many deviated from this policy also)...including dry socks, combat swimming trunks, tennis shoes, and distinctive headgear. We stayed wet after rains and streams crossings;
No toilet paper was carried and wiping was done with vegetation or the bare hand which typically required scheduling immediately prior to stream crossings to allow for washing up. Feces were buried carefully off trail and with the assumption would be uncovered by animals. With the minimal amount of food that we were able to carry and consume, bowel movements were not common or were the growth of body hair;
Urination was performed also off trail on forest litter and along the sides of already saturated tree trunks;
. Trail blazing debris in mountains along the Laos and Cambodia Borders was done using foxfire branches which were replenished at night and placed on the ground along the right side of the trail using four symbols (STOP...link up; DANGER LEFT; DANGER RIGHT; and DANGER AHEAD). The last man in the formation recovered the foxfire that was given to the lead person during each morning assembly at the designated observation points;
Foraged food waste such as fish bones of rotted fish removed from stream traps were placed in pockets until dry and then 'chewed'; fruit pits were 'sucked on'...savored like the wrappings of the 'jungle chocolate bar' wrappers and eventually buried in the same manner as feces; the wild limes that were consumed skin and all as were the other food found around abandoned slash and burn areas;
Rifles, pistols, knives and machetes were cleaned with soap and water prior to missions and shaken in the water at stream crossings and a new round was chambered daily. Ammunition was not oiled but wiped down when initially transferred to magazines in base camp. We did not experience weapons malfunctions during test firings before and after operations;
If the 101st Recondo emergency soap dish wrapped to our LBE was opened to administer morphine or other drugs or to perform suturing, then the contents were resealed and rewrapped with the old tape. The tape was good for reuse if the effort was made to keep it untangled while removing or at least good enough until the mission was completed;
All LRRP personnel were to be non-smokers and or chewers since both diminish the sense of smell. Many deviated from this policy but NOT when on LRRP operations and therefore waste disposal for these items was not a factor;

During 1965 and early 1966 drug use was not prevalent and NO Chinese Bandit LRRP Team members were pot heads or had smoked POT or used other drugs; therefore no disposal issues regarding drug use were necessary.

There were other waste disposal procedures and many were very detailed and constantly evolving. The topics included sharpening pencils, etc.

It was a mistake to wear anything other than clothing that resembled the NVA or the indigenous populations, however, each of us wore uniforms that were preferred and reflected sentiments rather than optimized for the terrain, weather and enemy situation. I regret not studying more carefully the enemy and local attire, and then specifying a uniform that was more appropriate. In the case of the dry season along the border in 1965 and early 1966 that uniform would have included combat swimming trucks, that have the large leg openings which provided ease of movement and good air circulation and tennis shoes that had soles identical to that worn by some of the NVA and local population. We did request and the military did produce a jungle boot having human footprint and NVA soles. The boots were not available until after the Chinese Bandits were disbanded and I have been informed that some special operations teams did use them and found them inadequate for a number of reasons.

A third and not well developed or approved escape protocol was discussed amongst team members that considered escape routes through Laos and Cambodia to the safe refuge afforded by Thailand which was located approximately 250 kilometers from the tri-border area where the Chinese Bandit LRRP operations were performed. Operating along the border line afforded escape routes in both directions and the decision was made that each LRRP Team member had the discretion to use the best terrain during their escape efforts and that cross border maneuvering was not prohibited. When patrolling along the actual border, fifty percent of the terrain that afforded the best escape route was located beyond the border of South Vietnam. Each team member carried a portion of a ‘one over the world’ scale topographic map that encompassed the tri-border area of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos that also included the area extending to the border of Thailand. Area and other order of battle information were requested for both sides of the border and this information contained the same degree of detail. We had been provided road maps of the same regions that depicted the general geography, including cities and land usage. Copies of these maps were not carried during operations along the border but were studied to evaluate the feasibility and potential routes of escape that would provide adequate concealment for night movement and possible foraging opportunities. We did seek approval for this cross border escape option but each man knew that it was an option if the approved escape protocols were deemed more dangerous. If this option had been executed during the later days of any long-range reconnaissance mission, then our carried food supply would have been depleted and therefore, foraging near hamlets and fields that were encountered would have taken place. Night cross-country routes in heavily forested areas were deemed safer than any movement near occupied hamlets and villages. Dogs, pigs and other domestic animals were typically alert at night and any disturbances would have been investigated, therefore, the plan was to proceed without attempts to gather foods and maintain a minimum 25 kilometer per day rate of movement when enroute towards Thailand. It would not have been difficult and the option was viable.

The escape plan options permitted the team to focus on locating the enemy and performing the evaluations that were feasible from a distance and maintaining such distance that minimized any chance encounters with the NVA or being detected.

The Chinese Bandit LRRP Team used foxfire, an aid to night tracking and trail marking extensively in the spring and summer of 1966. Foxfire covered branches were placed along side of trails to provide information to following team members and to provide additional nighttime illumination. The branches were collected by the last man of the patrol and redistributed when the team reassembled during the daily occupation of the observation assembly areas.

Constant efforts were made to identify the plants and animals of the Central Highlands and the understanding provided immeasurable benefits. Leaves from the several trees that provided the most common encountered edible wild fruits were collected and provided to intelligence staff on completion of previous patrols and we were informed of the name of the tree, where the trees were expected to grow and some information that confirmed the edibility and nutritional value of the fruits that augmented our diet.

Spider webs were especially interesting to team members and when it was observed that certain species of web tending spiders erected their webs at different times of night and in different types of habitat and at different heights above the trail surface, several us made the effort to evaluate web encounters as an indicator of recent trail activity. The webs were often easy to detect in certain nighttime light conditions and any disturbed or damaged web was reason to suspect the presence of something that recently passed along the trail. It was also observed that some species of spiders erected their webs early in the evening and removed them early in the morning. Any disturbance of these webs was a good indication that the damage had occurred during the same night when they were encountered. We later made requests for more information of the spider web building activities but were not provided any follow-up information on the subject.

Many suspected animal nighttime sounds were investigated. Moving files of ants often created a noise that was suspected to be the sound of a crawling snake. Each suspected ‘crawling’ snake investigation resulted in the discovery of insects moving in a file formation. Many snakes were encountered but few at night and they were never found by any sound that was made but solely by visual detection. The large black jungle forest scorpion also was solely detected by visual sightings.

Our knowledge of the preferred habitat of mosquitoes and the small black land leeches enabled us to avoid them to some extent. When they were encountered we typically deviated from our intended route and occupation sites to escape them. Drier and areas having more air movement were areas preferred for movement and observation points. However, frequent encounters with mosquitoes and leeches could not be avoided and mosquito repellent was used against both of these pests, despite our internal policy not to do so.

The repellent greatly reduced the sense of smell of anyone using the liquid and every effort was made to restrict the use of the repellent and stream crossings provided the opportunity to bath and wash away the liquid and smell of it. We had decided that the repellent would not be carried on the LRRP operations along the border; however, several persons did not comply with this requirement and we all shared the repellent when invested with the leeches.

Soap, toothpaste and other lotions were also not carried or used by any Chinese Bandit LRRP team member. Toothbrushes were carried and used often. Gun solvents and weapons cleaning equipment was not carried either. We relied solely on frequent stream crossings to clean our bodies, uniforms and equipment, including shaking the rifles vigorously in the water. All equipment including weapons had been washed with soap and water since November 1965 and little oils or solvents could be detected on them. Our ammunition was not washed but wiped dry of any oils. The M16 rifles only required re-chambering a round each day to remain functional and prevent jamming. In the few situations when we did fire our weapons no misfires had occurred during the long-range reconnaissance operations that were only scheduled for a two-week period. Test firing in base camp or during patrols that were deemed ‘secured’ did not result in weapon malfunctions. I later opted to carry my personal Browning Hi-Power M35 pistol with only one fully loaded magazine. The pistol was carried in a brown issued shoulder holster. It was cumbersome to carry a M16 rifle that was the LRRP teams designated personal weapon and the walking stick that I used. The rifles were typically carried at the ‘Ranger carry’ with slings removed and silenced with duct tape wrappings and strips of camouflage fabric. While moving at night with the rifle it was necessary to store the walking stick between my harness straps near my waist and could do so only in vegetation that provided a four-foot wide ease of movement. The foxfire inlayed stick was used primarily for trail signaling at night and carrying the Browning pistol provided improved ease of movement. The pistol had a blue finish and would easily rust without daily cleaning with solvents and oils. I decided to not clean the pistol and intended to rub off any rusting using ‘elbow grease’ only. The pistol was purchased as a used weapon and was in excellent condition but was rusted and pitted after only one week of patrolling and attempting to rub off the rust that began accumulating immediately after washing the pistol in hot water and soap at base camp. The Browning was left in the rear for the remainder of my tour and I carried a cleaned with water and sand only issued M1911A1 during subsequent patrolling. A new round was chambered in the .45 caliber pistol each morning and did not malfunction when test fired or during target practice. I can still remember the smell of the odors of gun solvents, oils and insecticides that permeated the tents at base camp. Other than our own sweat and the odor of our food, the Chinese Bandit LRRP Team smelled of the surrounding mountainous jungle.

The importance of not using any substance that would decrease our sense of smell was emphasized daily when the odor of smoke and animals and people that were encountered were detected from distances that required training, experience and vigilance.

Bandit LRRP team members were instructed to moisten their nose hair using fresh water to enhance their sense of smell and were required to practice ‘sniffing the air’ which required shifting the head and seeking out air movements that were expected due to the prevailing wind and air movements created by topography and moving water. Heightening the sense of smell, hearing and vision was always practiced when we ‘lay dogged’ after insertions and during the frequent encounters with variations in vegetation, weather, topology or light conditions.

Not being detected and detecting required our constant efforts at improvement.


Delta Company History (1965-66) Short Duration Patrolling by the Chinese Bandits Recon 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav in January 1966…RANGER SGT Jerry Conners, Chinese Bandit 13.

Upon completion of our first Cambodia border combat action, the 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav, 1st Airborne Brigade was rotated to the AnKhe perimeter defensive positions that were still under construction in January 1966. The Chinese Bandits were ordered to conduct reconnaissance patrols and establish ambush positions where the 1st and 2d Scout Squads were designated areas of operations which where suspected NVA approach routes to Hong Kong Mountain located near AnKhe; and the 3d Scout Squad (Chinese Bandit 13) was selected for various reconnaissance patrolling duties at various scattered areas to the northwest and southwest where enemy movement had been recently detected. The majority of the scout squad patrols were intended to be completed in three days and involved day and night movement and the selection of one ambush position that was to be determined by the scout squad leader and based on detected or suspected enemy use of the area.

The patrols conducted by the Chinese Bandit 13 scout squad required one day of planning and preparation and were executed in three or four days, followed by a one or two day opportunity to visit the `sights of AnKhe'. Although the patrols were under the direct control of the scout squad leader, various squad members were designated as the patrol leader and all scouts were rotated into positions that provided them training to sharpen their field leadership skills in navigation, communications and general patrolling skills. The designated patrol leader was required to organize and conduct the warning and operations orders, rehearsals, and ALL execution phases of the patrol and prepare the final debriefing. Frank Spickler, Carlos Hatcher, Frank Cunningham, Louis Tyler and Raymond Carley displayed the most interest in the opportunity to being assigned the patrol leader duties and normally lead the patrols, the actual 3d Scout Squad Leader, Sergeant Jerry Conners, accompanied them. The operations were conducted with the leadership roles performed in the same manner as students attending the 101st Recondo and Ranger schools. Participating in the navigation team was of interest to all members and Sergeant Conners spent the majority of his time working with those chosen to determine the route, construct the terrain table, and perform the point team navigation role during the patrols. We had used this training method before the war to prepare their scouts for the 101st Recondo and Ranger schools where they were expected to be the honor graduates of their class and return with the Recondo guidon and Ranger honor graduate plaque. The skill improvements were essential and the confidence and morale of the Chinese Bandit 3d Scout Squad improved significantly during this period.

Our last in-country parachute training, proficiency pay jumps, were conducted a month earlier in late December; however other air assault training was performed during the period before and after the patrols. The Chinese Bandits provided the instructors for assault rappelling refresher training for the 1st Airborne Brigade. Carlos Hatcher had the most interest in helicopter operations and was responsible for maintaining the helicopter rappelling equipment, including wire rope, clamps, anchor rings, 2000lb tensile snap links and 3000+ lb tensile strength green rope (and sections cut into Swiss seats) and a roll of white `glacier' rope having a lesser stretch factor. The equipment was stored in one of our conex containers near our Jumping Mustangs LZ located downhill from our tents at AnKhe. Hatcher was an 11th Air Assault trained and designated rappelling jumpmaster and rigged the two UH-1s that we used to conduct refresher training; and performed the jumpmaster duties on one of the helicopters during the actual rappelling. The 227th Aviation Battalion regularly provided helicopter support and the crews were experienced in day and night helicopter rappelling. Their helicopters would begin to overheat after about thirty minutes and required `dropping the ropes and going for a cooling run'. Although not an aviator but having established an excellent working relationship with the flight crews while in the 11th Air Assault, Hatcher was occasionally allowed to sit in the co-pilots seat during these short low level flights and permitted to fly the helicopter. The flights lasted only ten minutes but were the highlight of Hatcher's involvement in the training. He was scheduled to attend the Army's flight school and took every opportunity to volunteer in our pathfinder and other air assault duties but was killed at Bon Song a month later. He normally served as our rear security man and fought at the right side of the scout squad leader when engaged with the enemy and had done so since December 27, 1965 when the Chinese Bandits were fired upon during an air assault near Pleiku. As the last man in movement, his appearance in the assault formation was confirmation that all men were on line and could provide an explanation when they were not. He could perform any scout duty well but was indispensable in many. He, Raymond Carley and Frank Spickler (ex-11th Air Assault Recon) designed and ordered the Chinese Bandit Sudden Death cobra pocket patches and "calling cards". Neither Hatcher or Carley lived to see them nor the scroll patch designed later by Combat Jones; however, visiting members of the Chinese Bandits place the patches on their graves.

Louis Tyler was the lead point team scout during this period. He had an eye for anything unusual along the route and did not hesitate to evaluate anything that alarmed him. He had a developed interest in topographic maps and aerial photographs, as did all Chinese Bandit 13 scouts, and took responsibility for locating the enemy and moving quickly along our route. When I hear the words to the later released rock and roll song "Run through the Jungle", I think of him. Then SSG Robert Grimes, our platoon leader and platoon sergeant at the time, selected him as a member of the Chinese Bandit LRRP Team that conducted the 75 km operation along the northern border of Cambodia in the spring of 1966. He was the lead scout on much of that operation but medivaced when he became unconscious and his fever was dangerously elevated. We spent many hours together prior to the three and four-day patrols performing the topographic map spider drills and creating practice trail sketches to sharpen our tracking skills. Tyler had an unusual interest in everything. We have been unable to locate him or his family, but continue to try.

Frank Spickler, the 3d Scout Squad Team leader, and second in command was courageous without a fault. He attempted to master everything related to conducting day and night long range patrolling and combat engagements. His position required that he more frequently serve as the patrol leader and did so. His training was something that he chose but focused on navigation and communications, including fire and aerial support coordinations and the training of the other Chinese Bandits. During this period I began to have confidence in his abilities and believed that Chinese Bandit 13 would perform as well with or without me. Frank never lost his ability to think and perform in the most dangerous situations, he simply gritted his teeth and put `getting the job done' first. The fact that he survived the Vietnam war was not something that I expected. During any engagement Spickler would maneuver himself to get into the best position to assist the men and our efforts to control any situation had an imaginary line that only he and I could see and we both operated on our side of that line. This arrangement worked and we both discussed our roles if one of us had been killed and the adjustment in the chain of command that would have been necessary. We practiced this combat change of command during several drills preparing for the patrols. No one had any doubt that Frank would take command when it became time to do so and his standards for performance would be as high and probably higher than mine. At times it was difficult to harness his energy but never an unpleasant experience, only a strong pressure felt on the reins during enemy contact. Frank would later spend many months in a hospital and almost die from a chest wound while serving as an airborne platoon sergeant in the 101st Airborne Division.

Terry Stevens was the Chinese Bandit 13 radio operator, somewhat reluctantly at first since he wanted to carry the M60 machine gun that was carried when the weapon was necessary. He carried the PRC- 25 and the field expedient vertical half rhombic in addition to his short and long antennas and the SOI tethered about his neck and was developing the ability to know his position to six digit coordinates at all times. He was able to accomplish this feat during this period where we were conducting the patrols from our base at AnKhe. He would perform a map check at each ridgeline and mid-valley crossing and then visualize his position on the map between. He also memorized the pre-arranged fire and other critical check point names and locations and could call a fire mission without consulting his map, or at least initiate the call and adjust as necessary. The advantage of his ability to do so was appreciated by all Chinese Bandits and something that is a pleasure to remember. Stevens' willingness and preference to serve as the Chinese Bandit 13 RTO occurred only when it was apparent that he was a FO first and RTO second. I rarely actually used the radio, and relied him to perform all routine radio transmissions and only did when he thought I might have something to offer or believed that something was to be gained by my personally communicating. He prepared every situation report and I only confirmed the grid coordinate locations after Stevens and another scout had completed a confirmation check. I do not recall him ever making a mistake. Although our internal SOPs required my checking all coded messages, I rarely did so and relied totally on Stevens and another scout to insure that no errors were made. Stevens was also selected for the Chinese Bandit LRRP Team and his role as an RTO was expanded since he was often not in direct contact with either SSG Grimes or myself. His command and control responsibilities required an expertise and level of initiative that was necessary since separation between LRRP team members was normally deemed essential. He performed these duties without any problems occurring. The PRC-25 did not provide the long distance capability needed during these short duration patrols; however the Division had aviations assets and relay equipment that were used to support our hourly situation reporting requirements. The inherent danger of not operating with continuous uninterrupted communication capabilities and unable to request supporting fires and other support was apparent to all. We were provided emergency frequencies for contact with other friendly forces, however no direct coordinations were or rehearsed with such units. Operating without established and continuous communications capabilities was an error that was not rectified for two months. Stevens continued to sharpen his RTO and FO skills during this early combat period and several months later I recall our running towards each other while he was initiating a call for fire and only having to say "SHIFT RIGHT and FIRE FOR EFFECT". Stevens was largely responsible for our being deadly on the battlefield.

We have been unable to locate Stevens either. Duke Barrett of the Chinese Bandit 2d Scout Squad said several years ago, "your Chinese Bandit 13 scouts came home and disappeared back into the mountains where they came from." That may not be true for those scouts that had been born and raised in cities, but it may apply to Terry Stevens, ex-11th Air Assault Recon.

Frank Cunningham had been assigned to the Chinese Bandits while we were conducting the first Cambodia border operations in early January. He had volunteered for a levy from his V Corps LRRP unit while assigned to Germany. Cunningham required little training and only an adjustment to our procedures and the terrain. He quickly demonstrated his superior scouting skills and assisted in training the other Chinese Bandits in map reading and navigation and specifically route selection. Cunningham trained and demonstrated his excellent abilities as the designated patrol leader and in January it was understood that if Frank Spickler or I would go down then Cunningham would move into our leadership position. He preferred point but was later to assume the rear security role when Hatcher was killed. Cunningham was an obvious candidate for the first LRRP team operation along the Cambodia border but was not selected to insure the leadership of Chinese Bandit 13 in the event of my death. Frank Spickler was likewise prevented from participating in our first 12 day LRRP operation, but both men would participate in the second LRRP operation along the border of Laos where we participated in an evaluation of the NVA's radio communications capabilities. Cunningham's skill and determination to perform long-range reconnaissance operations greatly influenced Chinese Bandit 13 being selected to perform such roles. His demeanor was and remains that of a genuine explorer and scout and the photograph of his Chinese Bandits aboard the UH-1 prior to an air assault captures the spirit of Larry Thorne and Robert Rogers and the Chinese Bandits. He is a reincarnation of Kit Carson.

Glen Winnescheck, a proud Wisconsin Winnebago and at my side earlier in the year when I had made an error resulting in the Chinese Bandits being exposed to enemy fire and were forced to attack and maneuver from a poor position. I was only able to yell, "enemy to front, ATTACK". Winnescheck came flying out of somewhere behind me and into his assigned fighting position on my left. The next few seconds occurred without firing our weapons but low crawling and diving to get into a more favorable and dominating position and although the Chinese Bandits were online and advancing at most times Winnescheck remained ahead of me maneuvering himself which shielded me to some degree. I was to ask him later if he had done this to protect me from fire. He did not answer and I had to say, "You will answer and I want the truth." He stared defiantly back and answered quietly "Yes." I did not have to ask him why and the memory of him awakens strong emotions. Of all the Chinese Bandits, I was the closest to Winnescheck. He is dead now, buried on the Reservation and we need to visit his grave when the tribe has a ceremony honoring him. It is not uncommon for fighting men to risk their lives for another, but it is unusual to be a man who has had the honor of one doing so for them. In January, I assumed many of us would die and that Winnescheck would do so at my side. Winnescheck fought on quietly during his tour with intense effort and commitment to the Chinese Bandits and our objective to help the Vietnamese and was of course wounded but survived the war. I regret going home and leaving him in-country alone but with other the Chinese Bandits. At the time we believed that we were freeing the oppressed and Winnescheck was committed proudly to that goal. He conducted himself honorably and was a gracious and courageous defender of the poor and disadvantaged. He served as a senior scout but it was understood that when our roles became more combat then reconnaissance he would be instrumental in overcoming the NVA opposition. He was a scout second and a warrior FIRST.

Big and Little Hall, one in red beret and the other always in the designated patrol uniform, both men rotated on point and mastered map reading and navigating. They performed point duties always as a team and were wounded early but were instrumental in developing the Chinese Bandits patrolling techniques and protocols during the January three and four-day patrolling period. Malaria brought down all of us from time to time and some more than others. Punji sticks took a toll on the point teams more than those performing other patrol duties and the Halls suffered from both experiences and Chinese Bandit 13 did not perform as well when they were absent. On one occasion while we were patrolling in the mountains near the border, Big Halls' confidence had peaked and with morale soaring donned his red beret and proceeded down a tall grassy trail following old tracks into the valley. We were spread long distances apart but when I came out of the trees and looked down the grassy slope ahead, I saw a prominent red item moving near the base of the hill. I ran down the trail to catch up with my point team and passed Little Hall to confront Big Hall. We linked up in an area that was coved in triple canopy jungle and along the trail heading towards the border of Cambodia. He had his rifle in the `ranger carry' position and was moving at a brisk walk. The tracks were still aged and there was no indication of the enemy, and he was determined to close the distance between the NVA and us. He heard me approaching when I was 20 meters behind him and turned grinning. I was wearing my snake eyes expression and he stopped smiling and waited for me. "Do you honestly think that red hat can't be seen?" I asked. "Do you want me to take it off and not wear it?" He responded. " No I want you to answer my question." It took him a few seconds to answer, "There are no NVA here and it will take us at least another half day to locate them." "Are you referring to their location on the aerial photos we were given," I replied. "Yes, but there are also no fresh tracks or other signs," he stated with conviction. I responded "You ain't that good to make that call yet. Don't wear the hat when it can be seen from a distance." And then, "Am I correct?" I asked. He replied, "Yes," immediately. Hall removed the hat and put it in his butt pack. Later it was demonstrated on many occasions that I was wrong. His knowledge was excellent and judgment regarding where the enemy were and were not was outstanding and he was permitted to wear the red beret whenever he believed it was appropriate to do so. The last time I saw him wearing it was not on patrol, although he did so, but in Sin City at the bar. Little Hall had some type of brown beret. The berets had been bought or traded from some South Vietnamese troops. Neither of the Halls, both men wounded during the same operation, has been located since their evacuation.

Other Chinese Bandits arrived later as replacements and the original eight man scout squad reached an assigned strength of twenty-three men but could rarely field nine men with individuals hospitalized for wounds and disease and authorized R & R. These new men were absorbed, trained and performed heroically and excellently.

Several of the patrols that we conducted in January 1966, have special significance but share a threshold of common experiences. The planning and preparation, air assault, day and night movements searching for the NVA, ambush selection and occupation, searching for the NVA while moving towards the pickup zones, extraction and debriefing phases were similar but the variation in the terrain and enemy situation provided the variables that kept the patrolling interesting and challenging.

All air assaults involved at least thirty minutes of flight time from our base at AnKhe and often provided by the same flight crews assigned to the 227th Aviation Battalion. The routes were never conducted directly to the insertion landing zones but varied for obvious reasons. The patrol areas in January were located at distances where artillery support was unavailable and encompassed the valleys and hills immediately east of the northern Cambodia and southern Laos borders.

The first of these three and four-day patrols was to be performed west of AnKhe in a long valley, which was not believed to be occupied or used by the NVA and only small Viet Cong units, were believed to be operating in the area. I selected Frank Spickler as the `informal' patrol leader and assisted him with the warning and operations order while Louis Tyler and Frank Cunningham worked with Raymond Carley on point team skills including map reading with emphasis placed on performing his `spider drill' exercise and creation of the terrain table. Carley had been designated the assigned M60 gunner in part due to his persistent request to carry the machinegun and another scout was temporarily designated to carry the M60 on the patrol. The area of operation provided the opportunity to make use of the machine gun and Spickler had chosen to use the weapon despite my `vote' not to do so.

Two UH-1s arrived at 0600 on the Mustang LZ located near our tents at AnKhe and the crews shut down their engines and secured their aircraft. I accompanied Spickler when he briefed the flight crews and discussed details related to our flight route, altitude, checkpoints, and actions approaching and on the landing zone where we would be inserted. The flight would take approximately 30 minutes.

With our patrol caps tucked into our shirts, we loaded aboard the helicopters thirty minutes later and began the flight to the insertion point. Spickler knelt behind and between the pilot and copilot seats and wore a flight helmet connected to the aircraft's communication system. I set in the seat nearest the pilot and observed Spickler call off each checkpoint while enroute and confirmed the release point ahead before removing the flight helmet as we approached the landing zone. Spickler gave the signal and we moved to sit on the edge of the floor with our feet on the landing struts of the helicopter. With the other helicopter to our rear, the pilot flared the helicopter and we exited onto the dry short grass field and ran towards the near tree line that marked the edge of the western hill.

The helicopters would return to AnKhe by another route and made no fake insertions. The procedure was deemed too dangerous for the flight crews and provided marginal benefits to minimizing our insertion being detected. We believed that any insertion would be investigated and that is was important that we quickly move long distances away from any landing zone and thereby increase the degree of difficulty in being followed and detected.

The Chinese Bandits from both helicopters assembled on the run and transitioned into a file formation with Carley at the lead. Tyler and Cunningham followed a short distance behind him. Carley lead the patrol northward along a trail towards the first checkpoint where we would conduct our first `laydog'. He, Tyler and Cunningham occasionally stopped to exam the trail that was dry and did not contain tracks of any kind. No member of the patrol conducted pace counts and was expected to `remain on the map' at all times with minimal map checks of the topographic maps that had been issued to each man. We moved at a 4 kilometer per hour pace and arrived at the laydog site in hour. The route along the valley consisted of gently rolling terrain with dense small, less than 25-foot tall trees and tall shrubs and became more dense and damp as we advanced northward. We occupied the site forming a 100-meter diameter circular perimeter after circling back along the trail. The scouts moved into the previously designated positions that had been identified from aerial photographs and all persons began the process to adjust to the sights, sounds and smells of the area. We did not anticipate enemy activity but understood the importance of optimizing our perception skills quickly and after only fifteen minutes of the last man occupying the site, the Chinese Bandits patrol began its file movement towards the next checkpoint.

Spickler and Terry Stevens would link up and discuss pre-arranged fire targets and emergency rendezvous points. Spickler and I assisted Stevens in his efforts to stay on the map within six digit coordinates using only infrequent map checks. Tyler and Cunningham were making similar efforts with Carley. We slowed our movement to about 2 km per hour without encountering any enemy or indigenous persons and stopped at predetermined locations where we `lay dogged' and observed and persons were permitted to eat portions of the C- rations that were carried. Each man carried only one C-ration meal per day and was permitted to carefully bury and conceal any cans, wrappers or other trash. We were easily able to advance northward for a distance of twenty-five kilometers before sundown.

I made frequent trips to the rear and brainstormed rear security duties and methods with Carlos Hatcher. I would take one of the Halls with me each time so that they would also benefit from the training involved when occasionally lagging back behind a greater distance in an effort to determine if we were being followed. During my movements along the patrol file I would normally carry my map out and had each individual point out our location using a small twig. Most of the Chinese Bandits were still struggling with terrain association at this time and their navigation skills were a major factor in their selection for participation on more difficult and dangerous missions. Earlier patrols conducted in late November and December had identified those individuals who were not committed to the mastery of navigation and other the skills required and they had been transferred to other units. `Remaining on the map' was approaching a `do or die' standard in Chinese Bandit 13 and each of the remaining men demonstrated continued improvement.

As darkness fell, the scouts moved closer together attempting to maintain visual contact with the man ahead. This was accomplished only sporadically, since the trail that we were following meandered through the tall trees and prevented continuous visual contact unless persons were to maintain a distance of less than twenty feet. On this early patrol we had planned to maintain a minimum distance between scouts of 50 meters that required adjusting as a scout was detected at lesser distances.

As planned, I joined the point team at EECT and assisted the point team in their navigation and tracking duties. We discussed many things during the next few hours, including the origin of any sighting, sound or smell and stopped frequently to examine the trail surface for any evidence of usage. Carley had not master map reading and land navigation at this stage and we stopped many times in the night to have `class'. The Chinese Bandits' rifle slings had been removed and members typically went down on one knee when stopping or leaned against a tree and selected halt positions that provided some advantage that could be either a creature comfort or afforded some tactical advantage.

We maintained our 50% awaken and alert policy at each laydog position and each scout was afforded the opportunity to sleep three hours during the first twenty-four hours of the patrol. Sleep cycles required the use of two men groupings during halts both during the day and night. Although I regularly `walked the line' to insure everyone was `accounted for' the standard for maintaining contact, knowing when to sleep and remained with each individual. We did not establish the teamwork needed to operate in this manner until late February. A counter-snoring program was enacted early and before December 1965; however, it took some time to solve the problem that was often specific to each individuals needs. In addition to 50% remaining alert, the two men grouping when sleeping was permitted also required an individual to prevent his `ranger buddy' from snoring. As we lost weight from our physical activity, minimal diet, and disease, persons that had snored previously did not or at least rarely; however, we remained vigilant to prevent the sounds of snoring or other noises being made by our sleeping comrades. Few persons talked in their sleep or experienced nightmares. We did not carry or wear gloves and learned to aggressively place a hand over the mouth and nose of others when necessary. I do not recall anyone sleep-walking but we remained alert for that behavior also.

One of the earliest errors that occurred when we stopped during laydog or other halts was a person urinating/defecating near their position. The smells dominated the odors in the area and prevented persons from developing the smell perceptions needed and would have been easily detected by anyone moving nearby. The Chinese Bandits had learned that urinating and defecating required planning and that persons having diarrhea should not patrol on missions where stealth was especially important.

An essential element at halts was the planning to do so after scouting trail intersections in all directions and then moving the entire patrol beyond that intersection where the rear security team would then monitor in the manner that was appropriate. Many previously unidentified trail intersections were discovered which required variation and flexibility to optimize our efforts to locate the enemy and minimize the risk of our discovery.

We encountered many suitable ambush sites but having found no evidence of human occupation or usage of the area, we continued northward to the planned trail intersection that turned westward and up the hillside covered in taller and sparsely spaced trees. As the sky began to lighten we approached the ridgeline having stopped many times to hold one-on-one navigation and tracking classes with specific patrol individuals. Noise discipline was not maintained and the discussions were not done quietly. I was confident of our assessment that the area was not occupied by enemy forces and took the opportunity to TRAIN. When operating in more dangerous situations, the Chinese Bandits remained in a training `mode', including individuals performing pushups and sit-ups on a frequent, often hourly basis; however, such physical training was discretionary but something that many of us believed important and necessary. Hatcher and I often `pushed away the mountains of Vietnam' with our feet elevated upslope. I do not recall for certain if he could do more than I but believe that he did so.

We performed the planned lay dog on the ridge line and I met with each Chinese Bandit to insure that they had our position plotted on their maps and remember the planned route that we would be taking during daylight and the tentative ambush site that would be occupied that night. Every Chinese Bandit correctly identified the route, ambush site and other critical points. We had only moved about six kilometers during the night and proceeded down hill along the trail reaching the next checkpoint located in the valley floor before 6 AM. We had moved more than 35 kilometers since being inserted.

At the valley floor we intercept the trail running parallel to the hill ridgeline. The valley terrain and vegetation was identical to that we had encountered the previous day and we advanced slowly southward towards at a pace that was intended to allow our passing the planned ambush site in the early evening. Again, no signs of human occupation or usage of the trail was found; however, we did not `go admin' and remained vigilant and shifted into our maximized efforts to maintain noise discipline while focusing on training the newly designated point team which consisted of the Halls. Tyler and Cunningham remained with them while Carley resumed his duties carrying the M60 machine gun. I continued moving along the file working with each man, but walked with Carley for long periods discussing our plans to get his navigation and tracking skills to the level that he sought.

Despite my direction and requests, many of the men had not abandoned their smoking habit and those individuals knew not to request that they be allowed to smoke but often carried the issued cigarettes with them hoping that conditions might permit them doing so. "Don't even think about it," I would say to some of them as we met along the trail. Chewing was not permitted either and spitting would have compounded the problem in our minimizing signs of our use of the trail.

I doubled back often to examine the signs that we were making along the trail and discussed the problem with Hatcher often. Each man avoided the trail when it was easily marked but this was more difficult to determine during darkness and we did not have the skills that would later evolve. Circling back at each planned halt and lay dog was always expected to reveal a talented enemy or local hunter following us, but that never happened until the Crazy Horse operation five months later and the circumstances were different.

The Halls had advanced navigation and tracking skills and after rotating Carley, Tyler was designated the patrol leader and Spickler moved rearward to assume his normal role in Chinese Bandits 13. I spent the much of the day with Tyler assisting him when needed and discussing our SOPs. He was very motivated and wanted to learn more. The need for a Ranger-Recondo school was evident and we talked about him going to Ranger school when he rotated home. I believed that he could have easily passed the course without attending either the 101st Recondo or 82nd Raider courses, but recommended he do so if assigned to either unit which was the expected next assignment for returning Chinese Bandits. I lost track of Tyler after the Chinese Bandit tour and do not know what he did later. Frank Spickler did attend the 101st Recondo School when he rotated but was shot in the chest on his second tour and his physical profile prevented him from attending Ranger school or remain on jump status and he left the military.

I did not intervene or coach anyone as the Chinese Bandit 13 patrol approached and passed the site selected earlier as a tentative ambush site. The site was located at a T-intersection of trails. The intersection did not reveal and signs of usage but Tyler made the decision that we would occupy the site as planned and lead the patrol southward for several kilometers before reversing direction and doubling back along side but not on the trail towards the T- intersection where the Chinese Bandits would occupy and form an L- shaped ambush. Hatcher remained back with another scout in an early warning role alongside the trail. He was not equipped with any radio equipment that would allow communication with Tyler at the actual ambush site and the SOP at the time required that he allow any personnel that numbered less than 10 persons pass without any action. If more than 10 persons were to pass, then he was expected to fire his M16 on full automatic at those following the `first ten' and immediately break contact and move rapidly to the designated rallying point that was located about 1000 meters uphill from the trail. In the event Hatcher made the decision to open fire, then all Chinese Bandits were required to immediately move towards the rally point and abandon any trip flares or Claymore mines that were setup in the kill zone. The point men, on this night, the Halls, were likewise occupying the other early warning position that was located uphill along the trail and had the same SOP.

As the men occupied their ambush position under EENT light conditions, I moved towards the Halls position and located them when they waved their patrol caps with `ranger eyes' in my direction. We talked quietly for an hour. None of the Chinese Bandits anticipated contact but remained vigilant with the `50% awake' routine. We did not have starlight scopes and the heavier infrared scopes and power source was only carried when we operating in open terrain where a long shot could be made. However, Chinese Bandit 13 did carry two smaller infrared observation devices capable of viewing objects to a range of about fifty meters. Each early warning team used one IR device.

I returned to the center of ambush site occupied by Tyler and Stevens and remained with them for several hours and informed them that I would move to Hatcher's position before moving southward further down the valley as I had planned earlier. Since we did not anticipate contact, I would move by myself southward along the trail for several thousand meters and meet the patrol in the morning at the designated checkpoint. In the event of an enemy engagement where weapons fire was exchanged, then I would meet the patrol at the designated ambush rally point. I did not take this action for practical reasons but scouting `out ahead' was something that did have some merits and I enjoyed doing so and attempting to find the NVA alone. Some of the Chinese Bandits were permitted to also do this later but not in January.

We linked up in the morning as planned and I rotated Carley back on point and Spickler as the patrol leader. The route we used crossed the valley where it narrowed and then northward along the opposite side of the valley. We occupied another ambush that night without detecting any sign of the enemy or indigenous personnel. Again, I left the patrol during the ambush and followed a trail that led towards a small treed depression in the valley. At daybreak, I reached the edge of the tree line where I found a small paper pamphlet that read "Don't be cannon fodder for Johnson, go home". I followed the trail into and down the slope into the bottom of the sink hole where I observed a pith helmet lying on the ground about 20 meters ahead. I turned and moved quickly back along the trail and in daylight back towards the checkpoint where I would link up with the patrol. I did discover human barefoot tracks that I had not noticed while moving in the darkness.

We were to be extracted from a clearing near the depression where I had located the pamphlet. When we were assembled, I notified Tyler and the others of the discovery of tracks, pamphlets and pith helmet and we discussed using the alternate LZ located further to south and near the route that we had taken the previous day. Stevens who had been transmitting hourly status reports during the daytime was instructed to send our extraction request using the alternate LZ in his next report. We were to be extracted at 7 AM and moved several kilometers backward along the trail to the LZ and arrived about twenty minutes before the aircraft were scheduled to arrive. We secured the LZ and did not locate any evidence of enemy activity but remained vigilant of the possible presence of enemy approaching from the direction where we had came and where the sightings were discovered.

Two UH-1s arrived as planned and we quickly boarded and made the return flight with each man considering what would have occurred if we had extended the patrol and followed the tracks found at the treed depression. Spickler again knelt between the pilots and called out the checkpoints along the route. Hatcher was doing the same thing in the trailing aircraft.

After landing at the Mustang LZ in AnKhe, the Chinese Bandit 13 patrol assembled at the picnic table near the field mess and compared notes and assisted in preparing the debriefing report while SSG Robert Grimes I discussed the pamphlet and other findings that were made only a few hours ago. We all ate breakfast together and the men returned to the Chinese Bandit tents while Grimes and I went to present the NATO format debriefing. The discoveries became the hot topic in the briefing and steered the group away from the equally important problem of solving our radio equipment limitations that would be only partially solved to any of our satisfaction two months later when the first DOD/MACV directed LRRP operation was performed by the Chinese Bandit LRRP team along the northern Cambodia border.


Delta Company History (1965-66) Chinese Bandit Parachute Jumps and Patrolling at Pleiku, S. Vietnam in December 1965 by RANGER Jerry Conners, Chinese Bandit 13

After the Battle of Ia Drang where the Chinese Bandits would be awarded their first Presidential Unit Citation for Extraordinary Heroism, the entire Chinese Bandit Recon Platoon was relocated to Lake Pleiku where patrolling was conducted on the margin of the tea plantations and in support of other Jumping Mustang search and destroy missions in the Kontum area while operating with the 1st Bn 9th Cav. Aerial and ground reconnaissance efforts had confirmed that the NVA were withdrawing towards Cambodia and only small enemy units were believed to be operating in the area; however the local American and South Vietnamese units remained concerned that another large NVA attack would occur during Christmas or New Years Day. Our patrolling confirmed that no large NVA units were mobilizing in or near the area.

A parachute proficiency jump was scheduled for December 29, 1965 and the Chinese Bandits and portions of the Jumping Mustang 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav performed parachute jumps from UH-1's on the drop zone located above the lake during a visit to our unit by General Westmoreland. Some of us had the opportunity to make more than one jump in the late afternoon. Several jumpmasters were used and most of the NCOs competed for the duty with RANGER Lawson obtaining the honor for the Chinese Bandits. This and other parachute activities are described briefly in Colonel Ken Mertel's book.

We continued to patrol in the Pleiku area in preparation for the planned assault into Cambodia that was tentatively scheduled for January. We rotated the assignments of each Chinese Bandit to provide them the opportunity to perform different patrolling assignments and roles. Tyler displayed the strongest interest in performing the lead point position and an aptitude for tracking and detecting signs of enemy activity. Both reconnaissance and combat patrolling exercises were performed where Frank Spickler was responsible for the support team that included Hatcher and Carley with his M-60 machinegun. We were able to practice all of our immediate action drills and continue to improve our skills, especially in navigating long distances.

On the morning of December 30, we boarded two UH-1 helicopters where I was accompanied by the assault team in the lead helicopter and the trail aircraft transported Spickler's support team. Our short flight would take us away from the tea plantations to a small village located west of Lake Pleiku where we were to be inserted on a two ship landing zone that offered no cover or concealment. The village was located about one kilometer from a South Vietnamese armored unit and had a civilian population of about 200 persons and enemy contact was not expected.

As we approached the landing zone, the Chinese Bandits positioned themselves on the struts with our patrol caps stowed and weapons readied. When the helicopter flared and settled to a running three feet hover, we jumped, ran and dropped to the ground about 30 meters from the departing helicopters. As the Chinese Bandits support team exited from the second helicopter and my assault team began to make zigzag runs towards the short fence that surrounded the village, we began receiving small arms fire from an unknown position within the village. I yelled for Frank to position the machine gun to the south near the street that divided the village in two parts and "Don't let anyone get through!" A second later two bullets struck the ground near me and I detected those firing from a position near the fence and north of where we had landed. As I aimed to return fire, two rifle carrying khaki clad men darted away from the fence line and towards the center of the village.

We continued our charged without firing towards the cover and concealment that was available beyond the fence. Some Chinese Bandits went through and others vaulted and dove over the fence. The fence was intended to secure small livestock and broke easily when I charged through it. Frank's support team ran the `100 yard dash' along my assault teams left flank and I heard him yell that he was in position. From the time we had begun to receive fire until both teams were in position less than fifteen seconds had lapsed. I did not check on the condition of the Chinese Bandits but pressed the attack while yelling to Frank that we were heading north and repeated again "Don't let them get through." As the assault team moved forward, I glanced back towards the landing zone and observed that no Chinese Bandits were down, as Tyler, and the two Halls began to maneuver I yelled to them to determine if they had been wounded and each man yelled back "No!" Without asking, Frank yelled from a distance that his men were `OK'.

We moved cautiously expecting contact but reached the north end of the village without finding anyone armed. Underground tunnels were located near each hut, which were constructed on stilts. Most men, women and children of the village moved to the safety of the underground bunkers as we approached but a few did not. Frank had not observed anyone crossing the street and I concluded that the enemy was hiding either on the side we had just searched or had crossed to the other side before Frank and his men had reached his observation and gun position.

The helicopters that had inserted us earlier had departed as planned and Stevens had been radioing situation reports as we were attacking. Two gunships and one command and control helicopter being flown by Colonel Mertel arrived overhead as we completed our search of the area east of the street being observed by Frank Spickler. Col. Mertel directed me to depart the village and move by foot to another landing zone for extraction while the gunships remained on station to provide supporting fires.

We did not return to the village and I did not question the decision to withdraw. The Jumping Mustang Daily Journal records that only four rounds were fired at the Chinese Bandits and that report is based solely on my report during the debriefing that occurred that evening in the Battalion Commander's CP.


Delta Company History (1965-66)